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A Bridge Over Troubled Waters —
Resolving Bank Financial Distress
in Canada
Janis Sarra*
When times get rough
and friends just can’t be found
Like a bridge over troubled water
I will ease your mind
Simon and Garfunkel1

I. INTRODUCTION
Effective June 2017, Canada formalized its new resolution
regime for “domestic systemically important banks” (“DSIB”), officially designating the Canada Deposit Insurance
Corporation (“CDIC”) as the resolution authority.2 Canada’s
*

1
2

Dr Janis P Sarra, Presidential Distinguished Professor, University
of British Columbia and Professor of Law, Peter A Allard School of
Law, UBC. My sincere thanks for very helpful advice from the
reviewers of this article. Thank you to Robert Sanderson, Mark
Zelmer and Michèle Bourque for additional information and
insights regarding the Canadian resolution framework, and to Dr
Stephen Madaus for information on the German system. The
information in this article is current to September 2017.
1969 Words and Music by Paul Simon.
Canada Budget Implementation Act 2017, No 1, SC 2017, c 20,
amending the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation Act, RSC
1985, c C-3, as amended [CDICA] and the Bank Act, SC 1991, c 46,
as amended [Bank Act]. CDIC, “CDIC is formally designated as
Canada’s resolution authority” (22 June 2017), online: 5http://
www.cdic.ca/en/newsroom/newsreleases/Pages/cdic-is-formally-designated-as-canada-resolution-authority.aspx4. The amendments,
part of Budget Implementation Act 2017, also require Canada’s
largest banks to submit resolution plans to CDIC.
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six largest banks have been designated as D-SIB.3 They
account for 90% of total assets among Canada’s federally
regulated deposit-taking institutions.4 “Resolution” is the
restructuring of a financially distressed or insolvent bank by a
designated authority. To “resolve” a bank is to use a series of
tools under banking and insolvency legislation to address its
financial distress in a manner that safeguards the public
interest, including continuity of the bank’s critical functions.
Resolution can provide for an orderly winding-up of the bank
or restructuring to restore the viability of all or part of the
institution to allow it to continue operating, called open bank
resolution. “Bridge bank”, a resolution tool discussed in Part
IV of this article, is where part or all of the assets, liabilities and/
or shares are transferred to a temporary entity until they can be
sold to a private-sector third party. “Bail-in” is a tool that
allows preferred shares and debt to be converted into equity,
placing part of the burden of bank failure on shareholders and
creditors of the bank, minimizing costs to taxpayers. Given
that banks have a critical intermediary role in the economy,
financial difficulties need to be resolved in an orderly and
efficient manner, avoiding undue disruption to the bank’s
activities and instability of the financial system.
This article examines the new resolution regime in the
context of the early intervention program by the financial
services regulator, the Office of the Superintendent of
Financial Institutions (“OSFI”), and the CDIC as both
deposit insurance authority and resolution authority. At first
glance, the Canadian system seems very patchwork and
disorganized. On closer examination, it resembles the
3

4

The banks are: Bank of Montreal, Bank of Nova Scotia, Canadian
Imperial Bank of Commerce, National Bank of Canada, Royal
Bank of Canada, and Toronto-Dominion Bank; see Department of
Finance Canada, “Backgrounder: Regulations to Implement the
Bank Recapitalization (Bail-in) Regime” (16 June 2017), online:
5http://www.fin.gc.ca/n17/data/17-057_1-eng.asp4.
OSFI, Annual Report 2016-2017 (September 2017), online: 5http://
www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/eng/docs/ar-ra/1617/eng/ar1617.pdf4 at 9
[“OSFI Annual Report 2016-2017”].
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architecture of a bridge, with a foundation, substructure and
superstructure, offering a complex but integrated set of
mechanisms to monitor the financial health of financial
institutions, to intervene at an early stage of financial
distress, and to resolve the financially distressed bank in a
timely manner. However, there remain important issues in
respect of financial conglomerate insolvency, in terms of
oversight and coordination.
The 2008-2010 global financial crisis highlighted that some
banks are so systemically important to the functioning of the
financial system and national economies that their failure has
far-reaching consequences. In a number of jurisdictions,
insolvent banks could not be liquidated under existing
insolvency processes without significantly disrupting
economic activity and imposing a huge burden on
taxpayers.5 Regulators realized they had inadequate tools to
deal with financially distressed banks that were viewed as “too
big to fail”.6 The interconnection of banks in their payment
systems, credit arrangements, securities settlement systems
and currency exchange systems7 create conditions for systemic
5

6

7

For a discussion, see Janis Sarra, “Prudential, Pragmatic and
Prescient, Reform of Bank Resolution Schemes”, (2012) International Insolvency Review 1-54, and Janis Sarra, “Bank Groups and
Financial Conglomerates, Retooling Resolution Regimes” (2014) 30
Law in Cont 7-50 [“Sarra”].
An example is the collapse in September 2008 of the Lehman
Brothers Group, a multinational financial services firm comprising
2,985 legal entities that operated in 50 countries, which highlighted
the need for an orderly resolution regime for systemically important
financial institutions; Alexandra Lai and Adi Mordel, The Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions, Bank of Canada
(Ottawa: Bank of Canada Financial System Review, June 2012)
[“Lai and Mordel”].
The Financial Stability Board (“FSB”) defines “financial market
infrastructure” as “a multilateral system among participating
financial institutions, including the operator of the system, used
for the purposes of recording, clearing, or settling payments,
securities, derivatives, or other financial transactions”. It includes
payment systems, central securities depositories, securities settlement systems, central counterparties, and trade repositories; see
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risk. The size, complexity and lack of substitutes for major
banks also contribute to their systemic importance and to
challenges in resolving their financial distress. Prior to and
during the crisis, there were also incentive effects. Directors
and officers had an incentive to take on excessive risk because
the banks received any upside potential value and faced limited
downside risk because of an implicit backstop guarantee that
governments would bail them out.8 One objective of the global
financial reform agenda is to reduce taxpayer-funded capital
injections into financially distressed banks as the means to
maintain financial stability.9
The Canadian Bank Act’s preamble recognizes that a strong
and efficient banking sector is essential to economic growth and
prosperity, and that banks must be able to compete effectively
and be resilient in a rapidly evolving marketplace, taking into
account the rights and interests of depositors and other
consumers of banking services.10 In turn, a strong banking
sector contributes to stability and public confidence in the
financial system and is important to the strength and security of
the national economy.11

8
9

10
11

FSB, “Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial
Institutions” (15 October 2014), online: FSB 5http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/2014/10/r_141015/4, [“FSB, Key Attributes”], citing CPSS-IOSCO, Principles for financial market
infrastructures (April 2012), online: Bank for International Settlements 5http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d101.htm4.
Lai and Mordel, supra note 6; Sarra supra note 5.
FSB, “Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial
Institutions” (4 November 2011), online: FSB 5http://www.fsb.org/
wp-content/uploads/r_111104cc.pdf4, updated FSB, Key Attributes,
supra note 7, with Annexes–General Guidance Appendix I, I-Annex
1: Information Sharing for Resolution Purposes; I-Annex 2: Institution-Specific Cross-border Cooperation Agreements; I-Annex 3:
Resolvability Assessments; I-Annex 4: Recovery and Resolution
Plans; I-Annex 5: Temporary stay on early termination rights. Sectorspecific Guidance Appendix II, II-Annex 1: Resolution of FMIs and
FMI Participants; II-Annex 2: Resolution of Insurers; and II-Annex
3: Client Asset Protection in Resolution.
Bank Act, supra note 2, preamble.
Ibid.
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The framework for identifying D-SIB is set out by the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (“BCBS”), which considers
bank-specific characteristics of systemic importance, such as
size, interconnectedness and substitutability, correlated with
the systemic impact of failure. 12 Banks designated as
systemically important are subject to higher levels of
supervision and higher capital requirements, reducing the
likelihood of failure.13 Canada did not previously have any
banks designated as globally systemically important financial
institutions (“G-SIFI”),14 as identified by the Financial
Stability Board (“FSB”) and BCBS.15 As this article goes to
press, the FSB has designated the Royal Bank of Canada as a
global systemically important bank.16
OSFI’s designation of D-SIB was informed by its own
intervention framework, as well as international developments,
tailoring what is needed domestically to protect the system, and
aligning it with international standards.17 More rigorous
12

13
14

15

16
17

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (“BCBS”), “A framework
for dealing with domestic systemically important banks” (2012),
online: Bank for International Settlements (“BIS”) 5http://
www.bis.org/publ/bcbs233.pdf4.
Ibid.
FSB, “Addressing SIFIs” (2017), online: FSB 5http://
www.fsb.org/what-we-do/policy-development/systematically-important-financial-institutions-sifis/4: “Systemically important financial institutions (SIFI) are financial institutions whose distress
or disorderly failure, because of their size, complexity and systemic
interconnectedness, would cause significant disruption to the wider
financial system and economic activity”.
In consultation with national authorities. FSB, “2016 list of global
systemically important banks” (21 November 2016), online: FSB
5http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/2016-list-of-global-systemically-important-banks-G-SIBs.pdf4; Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (“BCBS”), “Report and Recommendations
of the Cross-Border Bank Resolution Group” (2010), online: BIS
5http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs169.pdf4; BCBS, “Core Principles
for Effective Banking Supervision” (2011), online: 5http://www.bis.org/publ/ bcbs213.pdf4.
Royal Bank of Canada press release, 21 November 2017, online:
5rbc.com/newsroom4.
Mark Zelmer, “Remarks by Assistant Superintendent to the 2013
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disclosure requirements help facilitate greater market
discipline. 18 Moreover, the federal government has
recognized that Canadian D-SIB could potentially become
globally systemically important in the future, as evidenced by
the recent announcement regarding the Royal Bank, and
therefore resolution of systemically important banks should
align with international developments regarding capital
adequacy, liquidity and bank resolution. Reform is aimed at
creating the ability to resolve the financial distress of a
systemically important financial institution, distributing
losses more fairly, and stabilizing the financial system.
The FSB has been instrumental in working with the G20
countries to develop international standards that set out the
responsibilities, instruments and powers needed to enable
national authorities to resolve failing banks in an orderly
manner, without exposing taxpayers to losses.19 Canada has
been part of that effort. The Canadian financial system remained
resilient during the global financial crisis. Canada did not
experience any bank failures, and banks were able to maintain
their access to debt and equity markets throughout the crisis.20
The federal government’s approach to financial sector supervision
offered some important insights as the international community
began to develop new standards post-crisis.21 Such global

18

19
20

21

RBC Capital Markets Canadian Bank Chief Executive Officer
Conference, Toronto, Ontario” (8 January 2013), online: OSFI
5http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/osfi-bsif/med/sp-ds/Pages/
mz20130108.aspx4.
OSFI, “Guideline, Pillar 3 Disclosure Requirements” (April 2017,
effective 31 October 2018), online: OSFI 5http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/eng/docs/plr3.pdf4. See also OSFI, “Final Guideline D-11
Public Disclosure Requirements for Domestic Systemically Important Banks on Liquidity Coverage Ratio” (16 July 2014), online:
OSFI 5http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/eng/docs/lcr_let.pdf4.
FSB, Key Attributes, supra note 7.
Department of Finance, “Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement”
(17 June 2017), online: Canada Gazette 5http://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/
p1/2017/2017-06-17/html/reg4-eng.php4 [“Department of Finance,
Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement”].
Sarra, supra note 5.
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cooperation is important because major Canadian banks operate
internationally and rely heavily on global funding markets. Thus,
adopting international standards helps to signal strength of the
Canadian system to foreign interests outside of Canada, and
facilitates the ability of Canadian banks to operate and borrow
abroad.
The Canadian banking sector is a significant part of the
Canadian economy. It is healthy overall at the moment, with
financial institutions earning a record total net income of $39.1
billion CAD in 2016.22 Return on equity was 10%. Overall,
banks have maintained satisfactory levels of liquid assets in
response to the liquidity adequacy requirements set by OSFI,
which came into effect in January 2015.23 Demand deposits
continue to comprise approximately 54% of total deposits,
while brokered deposits, excluding D-SIB, remain fairly stable
at 32% of overall deposits.24 That mix of deposits means that
banks need to carry high levels of liquid assets. Canadian banks
continue to report Common Equity Tier 1 (“CET1”) capital
adequacy ratios well above the minimum CET1
requirements.25 Return on equity for the industry was
approximately 15% in 2016.26 That puts Canada ahead in
return on equity compared to major foreign peers.
22

23

24
25

26

Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation, “Annual Report 2017” (18
September 2017), online: CDIC 5http://www.cdic.ca/en/newsroom/financial-reports/Pages/2017-annual-report.aspx4 [“CDIC
Annual Report 2017”] at 12.
CDIC Annual Report 2017, supra note 22 at 14. The Leverage
Requirements Guideline and the Basel III Leverage Ratio were
implemented by OSFI in Q1 2015, replacing the longstanding assetto-capital multiple as an additional non-risk weighted measure to
constrain leverage at deposit-taking institutions, ibid at 15.
Ibid at 14.
Reflecting the 1% D-SIB capital surcharge. Small and mediumsized banks reported capital ratios well above the target level of 7%.
OSFI Annual Report 2016-2017, supra note 4 at 9-10. Basel III was
developed in a response to deficiencies in financial regulation
revealed by the global financial crisis, aimed at strengthening bank
capital requirements and introducing new regulatory requirements
on bank liquidity and bank leverage.
OSFI Annual Report 2016-2017, supra note 4 at 10.
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However, Canada is not immune from potential bank
failure, particularly its D-SIB. 27 Macroeconomic events
undermining the health of a D-SIB would also undermine
small and mid-tier domestic banks and raise questions
regarding confidence in the Canadian system generally.
Canada’s bank resolution regime is aimed at addressing risks
both within the country and cross-border systemic risk.28
Among other resolution tools, the Canada Deposit Insurance
Corporation Act (CDICA) now provides a new “bridge bank”
and “bail-in” conversion regime.29 Effective June 2017, the
CDIC has been formally designated as the resolution authority
for D-SIB, as well as its other member financial institutions. 30
The amended statute now requires Canada’s biggest banks to
develop and submit resolution plans.31
Part II of this article briefly examines the “superstructure”
that supports the “traffic” on the bridge, such as disclosure,
monitoring and deposit insurance. Parts III and IV examine the
“substructure”, the components that undergird the
superstructure, such as early intervention, financial institution
restructuring and winding-up of a financially distressed bank.32
27

28
29
30
31

32

Department of Finance, Canada, “Backgrounder: Regulations to
Implement the Bank Recapitalization (Bail-in) Regime” (16 June
2017), online: Department of Finance 5http://www.fin.gc.ca/n17/
data/17-057_1-eng.asp4 [“Department of Finance, Regulations to
Implement Bank Recapitalization”].
For example, CDIC signed a memorandum of understanding with
the United States Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in 2017.
CDIC Annual Report 2017, supra note 22 at 16.
CDICA, supra note 2.
CDIC, ibid note 2. CDIC also covers loan and trust companies and
associations governed by the Cooperative Credit Associations Act,
SC 1991, c 48, as amended, that take deposits.
Bill C-44, An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled
in Parliament on March 22, 2017, and other measures, 1st Sess, 42nd
Parl, 2017 (as passed by the Finance Committee 9 May 2017),
online: Open Parliament 5https://openparliament.ca/committees/
finance/42-1/86/justin-brown-1/4. Presenters: Lisa Pezzack (director), and Justin Brown (chief) from the Department of Finance,
Financial Sector Policy Branch.
This article does not discuss the Bank of Canada as the “lender of
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They discuss proposed regulations under the new bail-in
provisions and the contours of the new bridge bank resolution
tool. They examine Canada’s system against developing
international standards, including exploring whether we need
a national or lead resolution authority for financial
conglomerates. Part V briefly examines the “foundation”,
Canada’s capital adequacy and liquidity regime.
This article focuses on banks, and for ease of reference, uses
the terms “bank”, “financial institution” and “member
institution” interchangeably to refer to banks covered by the
CDICA insurance and resolution scheme. It should be noted
that there are other financial institutions that are member
financial institutions of CDIC.33 There are also provincially
incorporated credit unions and caisses populaires that are not
part of the federal resolution system. There are separate but
aligned resolution systems and insurance funds for insurance
companies operating in Canada in both the life insurance and
property and casualty insurance sectors.34 A discussion of these
resolution systems is beyond the scope of this article; however, a
key difference to note is that insurance sector funds are
privately operated and industry funded.35

33

34

35

last resort”; Bank of Canada, “Lender-of-Last-Resort Policies”
(2017), online: Bank of Canada 5http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/eppp-archive/100/201/301/bank_can_review/2006/spring/
cover/en/financial/llr.html4, which is an important overall function of the central bank.
For example, there is one federally regulated credit union. These
institutions are subject to some or all of the provisions discussed
here, but sometimes with nuanced differences, beyond the scope of
this article.
See for example, the industry-funded Assuris, which protects policy
holders of life insurance, online: Assuris 5http://www.assuris.ca/
Client/Assuris/Assuris_LP4W_LND_WebStation.nsf/welcome_en.html?ReadForm4; and the industry-funded Property and
Casualty Insurance Compensation Corporation, PACICC 5http://
www.pacicc.com/4 [“PACICC”].
The reader should look to the CDICA, supra note 2; the Winding-up
and Restructuring Act, RSC 1985, c W-11, as amended [WURA];
and the Bank Act, supra note 2 for information on these other
entities and processes.
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II. SUPERSTRUCTURE — GIRDERS AND TRUSSES
The girders of a bridge are those parts of its superstructure
that are load bearing, supporting the deck on which users
travel.36 Girder sections are typically made from a truss
network that increases their resistance to load. The trusses are
the structure of connected elements that withstand stress from
tension or respond to dynamic loads.37 If one thinks about the
users of financial services: people and businesses making
savings deposits, using chequing accounts, clearing and
settlement services, etc, banks and other deposit-taking
institutions need to be reliable and well-supported. Since
liquidity is almost always the biggest challenge for deposittaking banks, there needs to be confidence by customers in the
financial institution’s liquidity, or financial services traffic will
move elsewhere. In Canada, that confidence is supported by a
superstructure of active supervision by a prudential authority
on behalf of depositors and other creditors; deposit insurance;
and a system of disclosure and monitoring of the financial
health of banks by both prudential supervisors and the
marketplace more generally. There are mechanisms in place
to support the stresses and respond to dynamic changes in
financial markets.
1. Deposit Insurance
Although deposit insurance is remedial, it is also a preventive
mechanism in terms of confidence in the system and
accountability. CDIC provides deposit insurance against the
loss of eligible deposits at member institutions in the event of
failure, insuring over $770 billion in deposits at 82 financial
institutions in Canada.38 Eligible deposits include: savings
36
37
38

The History of Bridges, “Structure, Components and Parts of
Bridge” (2017), online: 5http://www.historyofbridges.com/factsabout-bridges/bridge-parts/4 [“History of Bridges”].
Ibid.
Deposits must be payable in Canada, in Canadian currency. CDIC
Annual Report 2017, supra note 22 at 3.
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accounts and chequing accounts, term deposits such as
guaranteed investment certificates (“GIC”) of five years or
less, money orders and bank drafts issued by CDIC members,
and cheques certified by CDIC members. Foreign currency
deposits or deposits with a term limit greater than five years are
not eligible for deposit insurance.39 Eligible deposits are
protected up to a maximum of $100,000 per depositor per
insured category.40
As a federal Crown corporation created in 1967, CDIC’s
goal is to help maintain stability of the Canadian financial
system by providing insurance against the loss of deposits, and
helping to maintain financial services in a manner that
minimizes exposure of CDIC to loss.41 Member institutions
include banks, federally regulated credit unions and other
designated entities.42 The D-SIB group of six banks represents
87% of the total insured deposits.43
The Canada Deposit Insurance Fund is funded by premiums
received from member institutions.44 Premium rates are a key
39
40
41
42

43
44

Ibid.
Section 12, CDICA, supra note 2
Section 7, CDICA, ibid.
Ibid, including loan and trust companies and associations that take
deposits and are governed by the Cooperative Credit Associations
Act, supra note 30. Of note is that Concentra Financial Services
Association, the sole retail association under the Cooperative Credit
Associations Act, restructured as a bank in January 2017, and the
federal government reports that there are no active institutions
currently subject to the Cooperative Credit Associations Act. The
Department of Finance in 2017 is seeking views on the merits of
maintaining or repealing the Cooperative Credit Associations Act.
Department of Finance, “Potential Policy Measures to Support a
Strong and Growing Economy: Positioning Canada’s Financial
Sector for the Future” (11 August 2017), online: Department of
Finance 5https://www.fin.gc.ca/activty/consult/pssge-psefc-eng.asp4. As noted in the introduction, references to member
institutions in this article are a reference to banks, although the
discussed provisions may also refer to these other member institutions; see CDICA, supra note 2.
CDIC Annual Report 2017, supra note 22 at 12: MD&A.
Section 20, CDICA, supra note 2. See also CDIC Annual Report
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determinant of how quickly CDIC’s ex ante funding is building
towards a minimum target of 100 basis points of insured
deposits.45 CDIC annually assesses and collects premiums
from each member institution.46 In the failures of 43 financial
institutions from 1970 to 1996, affecting some 2 million
Canadians, no one lost any money from insured deposits.47
Another girder supporting the system is the incentive created by
the funding structure. The ex ante funding comes exclusively
from the member financial institutions themselves, not
taxpayer dollars.48 Thus, there is greater incentive among the
institutions to monitor market developments, capital adequacy
and liquidity, because one bank failure will have an impact on
other banks, as previously noted.49 The CDIC’s provision for
deposit insurance losses was $1,600 million as at 31 March
2017, which is CDIC’s best estimate of the losses it is likely to
incur as a result of insuring deposits at member institutions,
based on the level of insured deposits, the expectation of default

45

46
47
48
49

2017, supra note 22 at 27: MD&A. In the 2016/2017 fiscal year,
premium revenue was $420 million. Increases in the premium rates,
changes in the categorization of member institutions and the growth
in insured deposits contributed to the increase in premium revenue.
CDIC has developed a funding plan that contemplates a series of
measured increases in premium rates to reach the minimum target
level by 2024/2025.
CDIC Annual Report 2017, supra note 22 at 27: MD&A.
“Premiums are based on the total amount of insured deposits held
by members as of April 30th each year, calculated in accordance
with the [CDICA, supra note 2], and its Differential Premiums Bylaw, which classifies member institutions into one of four premium
categories. Classification is based on a mix of quantitative and
qualitative factors. The increase in premium rates for 2016/2017, as
compared to 2015/2016, is consistent with CDIC’s strategy to
achieve its minimum target ex ante funding level.”
Section 21(1), CDICA, supra note 2.
CDIC, “History of Member Institution Failures” (2017), online: CDIC
5http://www.cdic.ca/en/about-cdic/resolution/Pages/history.aspx4
[“CDIC, History of Failures”].
However, tax dollars would be used until such time as funds could be
recovered through ex post assessments of surviving banks over time.
Appreciating that these costs will likely be passed on to deposit
holders.
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derived from probability statistics, the risk profile of specific
member institutions, and an expected loss given default.50
The partial pre-funding of deposit insurance means that
depositors of a failed small or medium-sized bank can receive
their money in a timely manner in the event of a bank failure.
There may not be sufficient pre-funding to cover the losses at a
major bank, which is why CDIC has access to government
funding if needed to cover depositor claims until costs can be
recovered through ex post insurance premiums on surviving
financial institutions.
Yet the pre-funded insurance scheme does not necessarily
ensure depositor confidence. The recent run on Home Capital
Group Inc is illustrative. Once news of the mortgage lender’s
financial distress spread in early 2017, depositors rapidly
withdrew their savings and brokers stopped recommending the
bank’s services, destabilizing the bank further.51 The bank had
$2 billion in deposits in March 2017 and two months later, only
an estimated $150 million remaining. 52 Notwithstanding
public education on deposit insurance, there was lack of
confidence in the system for depositors to stay.53 It is human
nature to want to move quickly to protect one’s savings; and no
doubt images still resonate from the global financial crisis of
depositors lined up at UK and other European banks, unable to
get their money out. Perhaps more important than individual
50

51

52

53

CDIC Annual Report 2017, supra note 22 at 24. The loss given
default estimate is based on the cumulative unweighted average loss
sustained by CDIC in member failures since 1987, adjusted for
measurement uncertainty as required by IFRS.
Tyler Durden, “Home Capital Bank Run Accelerates as Company
Scrambles to Find Additional Liquidity” (8 May 2017), online: Zero
Hedge 5http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-05-08/home-capitalsbank-run-accelerates-company-scrambles-find-additional-liquidity4.
Niall McGee and Andrew Willis, “Home Capital gets lifeline by
selling off up to $1.5-billion in mortgages” (9 May 2017), online:
Globe & Mail, 5https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/home-capital-sells-15-billion-in-mortgages/article34929147/
?ref=http://www.theglobeandmail.com&4.
In part, likely also due to allegations by the Ontario Securities
Commission of disclosure violations.
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depositors withdrawing savings, broker dealers were pulling
their accounts. Whether they did it on at their own discretion or
were given instruction by clients is unknown, but it was a
significant part of the run on the bank.
The CDIC can collect a special premium from member
institutions, or a class of institutions, in order to cover any loss
CDIC incurs as a result of pursuing its statutory objects or
identifying a more systemic problem with banks.54 CDIC is
expressly authorized to “do all things necessary or incidental”,
including: to acquire assets from a member institution; to make
or guarantee loans or advances, with or without security, to a
member institution; to make or guarantee a deposit or assume
liabilities of a member institution; to enter into an agreement
with a provincial government or its agent respecting any matter
relating to the insurance of deposits;55 and to make any
investment and enter into any transaction needed for the
financial management of CDIC.56 Its resolution authority is
discussed in Part III below.
In terms of assessing Canada’s deposit insurance fund
against international standards, Canada’s pre-funded
protection is, arguably, commensurate with similarly situated
jurisdictions. However, the monetary amount protected is
considerably less than other countries, as illustrated in Table
1.57 Some of the higher limits in other countries, such as the
United States (“US”), may be the result of governments trying
to forestall bank runs.

54
55
56
57

Section 7.3, CDICA, supra note 2.
With provincial institutions in that province.
Section 10(1), CDICA, supra note 2.
One source suggested that the federal government periodically scans
all deposits and finds that current insurance limits would cover
about 90% of the population, but the author could not find any
data or public disclosure that verifies this assertion.
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Table 1: Comparison of Bank Deposit Insurance, 201758

Jurisdiction

Amount of deposit protection

Pre-funded in
conjunction with
governmental backup
funding available?
Yes

Canada
$100,000 CAD
United
£85,000 [$137,226 CAD]
Yes
Kingdom
United States $250,000 USD [$314,657 CAD] Yes
Australia

No pre-funding, but
$250,000 AUD [$248,730 CAD] government funding
available

European
Union

₠100,000 [$147,929 CAD]

Germany

₠100,000 [$147,929 CAD], plus
voluntary secondary scheme
Yes
that protects up to ₠1 million
per client

Yes

Notwithstanding that one issue during the financial crisis
was that numerous deposit insurance schemes were not prefunded, the FSB report, Key Attributes of Effective Resolution
Regimes for Financial Institutions, does not require prefunding. It only specifies that jurisdictions should have in
place privately-financed deposit insurance or resolution funds,
or a funding mechanism with ex post recovery from the industry
of the costs of providing temporary financing to facilitate
resolution.59 While both types of truss protect depositors,
purely ex post funding can be untimely and place pressure on
public funds that pay out depositors’ savings and then try to
collect from the bank sector. However, as Table 1 illustrates,
many jurisdictions now ensure that the deposit insurance is at
least partially pre-funded, with access to government support if
needed.
58
59

Currency conversion as at 22 August 2017.
FSB, Key Attributes, supra note 7 at 6.3.
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In the United Kingdom (“UK”), as of 30 January 2017, the
deposit compensation limit is £85,000 per eligible deposit of
each person per firm.60 This amount varies each year as it is
dependent on compliance with European Union (“EU”)
Directive 2014/49/EU Deposit Guarantee Schemes, which
sets a harmonized level of ₠100,000.61 The UK amount is
thus affected by currency exchange rates.62 The insurance
funds of EU member states are pre-funded, as there is a
requirement that all EU deposit protection schemes be funded
ex ante.63 The UK Financial Services Compensation Scheme
(“FCSC”) is funded by an annual levy on authorized financial
services firms, the levy varying each year depending on the
amount required to protect deposits.64
60
61

62

63

64

Financial Services Compensation Scheme (“FSCS”), “Deposit
Limits” (2017), online: FSCS 5https://www.fscs.org.uk/what-wecover/compensation-limits/deposit-limits/4.
Directive 2014/49/EU Deposit Guarantee Schemes (16 April 2014),
online: EUR-Lex Access to European Law 5http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L00494 [“Directive”] at paras 21, 23, Article 6.
Tim Wallace, “Savers hit as Bank cuts protection on deposits to
£75,000 for first time since financial crisis” (3 July 2015), online: The
Telegraph, 5http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/bank-of-england/
11715807/Banks-to-cut-protection-on-deposits-to-75000-from-January.html4. In 2016, this amount was £75,000.
Directive, supra note 61 at para 27 and Articles 10, 14(4); FAQ, “A
European Deposit Insurance Scheme” (24 November 2015), online:
European Commission Press Release Database 5http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-6153_en.htm4.
FSCS, “Funding”, online: FSCS 5https://www.fscs.org.uk/industry/funding/4. The amount levied is the compensation paid out,
plus an estimate of compensation costs for the 12 months following
the levy date, plus the management expenses for the FSCS; FSCS,
“Cost Structure”, online: FSCS 5https://www.fscs.org.uk/industry/funding/cost-structure/; FSCS, “Levy Information”, online:
FSCS 5https://www.fscs.org.uk/industry/funding/levy-information/4, FSCS, “Levies Raised”, online: 5https://www.fscs.org.uk/globalassets/levy-information/20170810-levies-raised-since2009-10.pdf4. Consultation Paper, “Reviewing the funding of the
FSCS” (December 2016), online: Financial Conduct Authority
(“FCA”) 5https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/consultation/cp16-
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In the US, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(“FDIC”) covers up to $250,000 USD per depositor, per
insured bank, for each account ownership category.65 The US
Deposit Insurance Fund is funded ex ante by the banking
industry,66 and can also borrow up to $100 billion USD from
the US Treasury.67 In Australia, deposits are protected up to a
limit of $250,000 AUD for each account holder at each bank
that is incorporated in Australia and authorized by the
Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority.68 Australia’s
deposit insurance, the Financial Claims Scheme, is funded ex
post, with the Australian Government providing the funds and
then reclaiming them after liquidating the institution. If the
institution’s assets are insufficient, the government can place a
levy on the entire industry to recover the difference.69

65
66

67
68

69

42.pdf4 at para 1.2. The FCA determines the extent of the
protection provided by the FSCS, and how it is funded.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), “Deposit Insurance
at a Glance” (2014), online: FDIC 5https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/
deposits/brochures/deposit-insurance-at-a-glance-english.pdf4.
FDIC, “Deposit Insurance Funding: Assuring Confidence” (November 2013), online: FDIC 5https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/
assuringconfidence.pdf4 at 3 [Deposit Insurance Funding]; FDIC,
“Who is the FDIC?” (2017), online: FDIC 5https://www.fdic.gov/
about/learn/symbol/4; Aaron Klein, “A primer on Dodd-Frank’s
Orderly Liquidation Authority” (5 June 2017), online: Brookings
5https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2017/06/05/a-primeron-dodd-franks-orderly-liquidation-authority/4.
Deposit Insurance Funding, ibid at 7.
Financial Claims Scheme (“FCS”), “About the Financial Claims
Scheme”, online: Australian Prudential Regulation Authority
(“APRS”) FCS 5https://www.fcs.gov.au/about-apra4; APRS,
“Financial Claims Scheme”, online: APRA 5http://www.apra.gov.au/CrossIndustry/FCS/Pages/default.aspx4 [“APRS, Financial
Claims Scheme”]; Government of Australia, “Financial System
Inquiry Final Report” (November 2014), online: Financial System
Inquiry 5http://fsi.gov.au/files/2014/12/FSI_Final_Report_Consolidated20141210.pdf4 [“FSI Final Report”] at 37.
FSI Final Report, ibid at 82-83; Tarek Dale, “Funding the Financial
Claims Scheme” (30 March 2015), online: Parliament of Australia5http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/FlagPost/2015/March/FundingThe-Financial-Claims-Scheme4; Federal Register of Legislation,
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In Germany, every depositor has a legal right to repayment of
up to ₠100,000 as part of the statutory scheme complying with
the EU Directive.70 However, Germany has an additional
voluntary secondary scheme that can protect at least ₠1 million
up to the amount of 20% of their own capital per bank and
client.71 All statutory and voluntary deposit guarantee schemes
in Germany are pre-funded by a tax on all institutions
belonging to the scheme. The fund is required to raise, by
2024, up to 0.8% of covered deposits.72 If there are insufficient
funds, the scheme can levy extraordinary contributions to make
up the shortfalls.73
FSB’s Key Attributes report specifies that resolution plans
should protect insured depositors and insurance policy holders
and ensure the rapid return of segregated client assets.74 CDIC
primarily utilizes two methodologies to assess required ex ante
funding. The first is “discretionary analysis”, under which
CDIC considers the profile of its membership and determines
the ability of a specific level of funding to address the
hypothetical failure of member institutions. The second
methodology is “loss estimation”, which utilizes statistical
techniques to estimate multiple theoretical loss scenarios,
which then permit a calibration of funding levels.75 As part of its

70

71
72
73
74
75

“Financial Claims Scheme (ADIS) Levy Act” (2008), online:
Government of Australia 5https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2008A001034 at Articles 4, 5.
Deutsche Bundesbank, “Deposit Protection in Germany” (December
2015), online: Deutsche Bundesbank, 5https://www.bundesbank.de/
Redaktion/EN/Downloads/Publications/Monthly_Report_Articles/
2015/2015_12_deposit_protection.pdf?__blob=publicationFile4
[“Deutsche Bundesbank”] at 53.
Bankenverband, “The Deposit protection scheme”, online: Bankenverband 5http://en.bankenverband.de/tasks/deposit-protectionscheme/4 [“Bankenverband, Deposit protection scheme”].
Deutsche Bundesbank, supra note 70 at 53.
Ibid at 53-54.
FSB, Key Attributes, supra note 7 at 11.6.
CDIC Annual Report 2017, supra note 22 at 25. The inputs to a loss
estimation scenario include the level of insured deposits, probability
of default statistics and loss given default assumptions.
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regular assessment of sufficiency, CDIC stress tests model
assumptions to evaluate how changes in probability of default
and loss given default affect funding requirements.76
While the intention in Canada is to have all deposits covered
by the deposit insurance fund through ex ante funding, CDIC
has legislative authority to borrow up to $22 billion as a
financial backstop to insurance or resolution, subject to
ministerial approval, and additional borrowings, if required,
could be authorized by Parliament through an appropriation
act.77 Since CDIC ranks pari passu with uninsured creditors,
including depositors, for any amount for which it must pay that
is not covered by the insurance fund, it has an incentive to
intervene early in the monitoring, intervention and resolution
system.
2. Monitoring Banks’ Financial Health
The second supporting girder is the federal regulator, OSFI
or “the Superintendent”.78 OSFI supervises and regulates
federally registered banks and insurers, trust and loan
companies.79 In the mid-1990s, its constating legislation, the
Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Act
(OFSIA),80 and the CDICA were amended to more clearly
define OSFI’s role as prudential regulator, eliminating some
duplication in the oversight and governance roles of OSFI and
CDIC.

76
77
78
79
80

Ibid.
Ibid. The borrowing limit increases with the growth in insured
deposits.
OSFI, Superintendent (17 October 2017), online: OSFI 5http://
www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/Pages/default.aspx4.
Ibid. Federally regulated banks and insurers, trust and loan
companies, as well as private pension plans subject to federal
oversight.
Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Act, RSC 1985,
c 18 (3rd Supp), as amended [OSFIA].
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OSFI conducts risk-based assessments of the safety and
soundness of financial institutions.81 There is a detailed process
for reporting and acting on breaches of the CDICA.82 OSFI has
developed guidance on risk management and mitigation,
intervening when corrective actions need to be taken.83 OSFI
monitors and evaluates developments that could have a
negative impact on the bank’s financial condition, considering
how a bank may be vulnerable to different types of direct and
indirect exposures. It also monitors potential changes in the
nature and size of exposures; whether new or evolving practices
or products may be making institutions more vulnerable; and
whether the risk is isolated to a specific sector, the specific bank,
or is more systemic.84 OSFI monitors whether control functions
developed by a bank appropriately correspond to the risks,
including whether stress testing has been done.85
OSFI has an early intervention system, which includes a
“pre-stage”, after which there are four stages of intervention, as
discussed in Part III. The pre-stage is where monitoring reveals
normal activity and no significant problems.
i. No significant problems/normal activities
In monitoring a bank’s financial condition, OSFI assesses
whether the bank’s policies and practices, controls and
81
82
83

84
85

Section 27(1), CDICA, supra note 2, or as CDIC might require.
Section 30, CDICA, ibid.
Jamey Hubb, Assistant Superintendent, “Risk and Resilience –
Preparing for the Unforeseen” (8 June 2017), online: OSFI 5http://
www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/osfi-bsif/med/sp-ds/Pages/
jh20170608.aspx4 [“Hubb”]. OSFI collects data and analytics from
the institutions, regulatory partners in government, and other
international regulators and agencies; the data gives risk specialists
a broad cross-sector perspective when analyzing and identifying
potential risks that could have a material impact on Canadian
financial institutions.
Ibid.
Ibid. Hubb uses the example of when oil prices started declining in
2014, institutions’ responses were monitoring their direct and
indirect exposures, stress-testing their related portfolios and taking
prudent measures in their underwriting and loan management.
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circumstances are sufficient through both continuous
assessment and formal discussion on an annual basis of
supervisory activities over the previous year. 86 OSFI
determines whether the combination of the bank’s overall net
risk, capital and earnings makes it resilient to most normal
adverse business and economic conditions.87 It assesses the
financial condition and operating performance of the
institution, reviews information obtained from statutory
filings, financial reporting requirements, and management
reporting to the board.88 OSFI also undertakes cross-sector
reviews for specific issues involving multiple institutions, in
some cases, across banking and insurance sectors. OSFI will
meet with a board of directors, or provide the bank and chair of
the audit committee with a supervisory letter regarding
composite risk ratings. A composite risk rating is OSFI’s
overall assessment of an institution’s safety and soundness.89
Even where the institution’s performance has been satisfactory,
with most key indicators comparable to or exceeding industry
norms, OSFI can still request the bank to take corrective
measures.90 OSFI’s expectations are tied to the risks to which a
bank is exposed, which can vary across institutions. It also
assesses the adequacy of the internal governance, risk
management practices and control systems for managing
those risks. OSFI then monitors compliance with its requests,
often requiring additional information and/or conducting
follow-up supervisory reviews.
86
87
88
89

90

OSFI, “Supervisory Framework” (December 2010), online: OSFI
5http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/fi-if/rai-eri/sp-ps/Pages/sff.aspx4.
Ibid.
Ibid. OSFI reports to the Minister of Finance on an annual basis.
Ibid. There are four ratings for composite risk: “low”, “moderate”,
“above average” and “high”, guided by a set of assessment criteria
that were developed in consultation with the industry. OSFI can
request that the bank’s management provide a copy of the
supervisory letter to external auditors.
Ibid. For example, the financial institution may have access to
additional capital and is able to address supervisory concerns that
might arise.
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At this pre-stage, CDIC is also monitoring selected
individual banks via information available from member
institutions, OSFI, the Bank of Canada, and the Financial
Institutions Supervision Committee (“FISC”). FISC is a
statutory committee under the OFSIA, chaired by the
Superintendent, with representatives from the Department of
Finance, the Governor of the Bank of Canada and head of
CDIC.91
CDIC examines rating agency results, the results of OSFI’s
annual examinations of institutions and other sources,
monitoring for compliance with the CDICA and CDIC bylaws. OSFI and CDIC regularly exchange information and
discuss any remedial measures that either agency has
requested the institution to undertake.92 This monitoring
enables OSFI and CDIC to identify areas of concern
regarding specific banks at an early stage and intervene
effectively to minimize losses to depositors and the exposure
of CDIC to loss.93
III. SUBSTRUCTURE — EARLY INTERVENTION
The substructure of a bridge is comprised of those parts of the
structure, such as piers and abutments, that support the
superstructure and transfer the structural load to the
foundation.94 There are three primary components to the
substructure of Canada’s bank resolution regime. First is the
early intervention process by OFSI.95 Second is the series of
measures that CDIC can take as resolution authority,
91
92

93
94
95

FISC is comprised of five federal financial safety net agencies — the
Department of Finance, OSFI, the Bank of Canada, the Financial
Consumer Agency of Canada, and CDIC.
For example, OSFI provides CDIC with copies of risk assessment
summaries and any supervisory letters. OSFI, “Guide to Intervention for Federally Regulated Deposit-Taking Institutions” (4
February 2014), online: OSFI 5http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/fiif/rai-eri/sp-ps/Pages/gid.aspx4 [“OSFI, Guide to Intervention”].
Ibid.
History of Bridges, supra note 36.
OSFIA, supra note 80.
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including, as discussed in this part, financial restructuring,
bridge bank and bail-in measures. These abutments in the
financial system are aimed at ensuring, where possible, open
bank resolution, avoiding outright liquidation and working to
protect deposits and banking activity through a variety of
mechanisms discussed in this Part. The third component of the
substructure is the liquidation regime, under the Bank Act for
solvent banks and the Winding-up and Restructuring Act
(WURA) for insolvent financial institutions. 96 The
liquidation regime is aimed at winding-up the financial
institution in a manner that protects, to the greatest extent
possible, depositors and creditors. Many of these tools are used
together in various combinations.
To set the context, the FSB has reported that there are nine
key attributes for an effective bank resolution regime,
attributes that are being adopted internationally. 97 Bank
resolution regimes should ensure continuity of systemically
important financial services, and payment, clearing and
settlement functions. They need to protect, where applicable
and in coordination with the relevant insurance schemes,
depositors, insurance policy holders and investors covered by
such schemes and arrangements, ensuring the rapid return of
segregated client assets. Bank resolution should allocate
losses to equity investors and unsecured and uninsured
creditors in a manner that respects the hierarchy of claims.
The regime should not rely on public solvency support and
should not create an expectation that such support will be
available.
The FSB also reports that resolution regimes should avoid
unnecessary destruction of value, and therefore seek to
minimize the overall costs of resolution in home and host
jurisdictions, including, where consistent with the other
objectives, losses for creditors.98 Bank resolution systems
96
97
98

Bank Act, supra note 2; WURA, supra note 35.
FSB, Key Attributes, supra note 7.
Ibid.
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should provide for speed, transparency, and as much
predictability as possible through legal and procedural clarity
and advanced planning for orderly resolution. The law
governing bank resolution should mandate cooperation,
information exchange and coordination domestically and
internationally with relevant resolution authorities. Such
cooperation is required before and during resolution. Bank
resolution must ensure that non-viable firms can exit the
market in an orderly way, thereby enhancing market discipline
and providing incentives for market-based solutions.99 These
key attributes assist in assessing Canadian developments.
1. Canada’s Early Intervention Process
A hallmark of the Canadian regime is its early intervention
process. The financial institutions’ statutes provide a wide
range of discretionary intervention powers that allow OSFI
and CDIC to require federally-regulated deposit-taking
institutions to address viability concerns.100 The intervention
process assesses the unique circumstances of the financial
institution, including its nature, scope, complexity, and risk
profile.101 There are four stages of intervention, from early
warning to more intrusive action at the point of non-viability.
OSFI’s “Guide to Intervention” outlines the circumstances
under which certain measures may be deployed.102 There is
flexibility in that intervention tools described at one stage can
be used at multiple or different stages. OSFI updates risk
assessments and stage ratings as needed during the year as part
of its continuous oversight. OSFI has, under the Bank Act,
critically important powers to issue capital and liquidity
directives, replace the board and senior management, and/or
99 Ibid.
100 Bank Act, supra, note 2; CDICA, supra note 2; OSFIA, supra note
80; Trust and Loan Companies Act, SC 1991, c 45, as amended
[Trust and Loan Companies Act]; and the Cooperative Credit
Associations Act, supra note 30.
101 OSFI, Guide to Intervention, supra note 92.
102 Ibid.

Annual Review of Insolvency Law / 279

take control of an institution if needed.103 These extraordinary
powers give OSFI great authority to promote adherence by
financial institutions to its guidelines and its supervisory
expectations and directions.
i. Stage 1 — early warning
Where OSFI has identified deficiencies in the institution’s
financial or other conditions, policies or procedures, it may
place the bank into the Stage 1 early warning process. Stage 1
can be initiated where the combination of the institution’s
overall net risk and its capital and earnings compromises the
institution’s resilience; or the institution has risk management
issues or control deficiencies that, although not serious enough
to threaten financial viability, should be addressed. OSFI may
formally notify the directors, officers and the bank’s external
auditor by way of a supervisory letter that the institution is at
Stage 1, requiring the bank to take measures to mitigate or
rectify the identified deficiencies. OSFI may also meet with
management, directors and/or the external auditor to outline
concerns about the bank’s safety and soundness and discuss
remedial action.
OSFI can send a notice assessing a surcharge on the
institution;104 monitor it on an escalating basis by increasing
the frequency of reporting requirements and/or expanding the
detail of information that the institution is required to submit.
It can conduct enhanced or more frequent supervisory reviews,
or direct the institution’s internal specialists to conduct reviews
that focus on areas of concern, such as asset or loan security
valuations. OSFI can enter into a prudential agreement with
103 Bank Act, supra note 2.
104 OSFI, Guide to Intervention, supra note 92. “A Notice of Assessment
Surcharge is a notice in writing that is sent by the Superintendent to an
institution advising that an assessment surcharge has been issued to the
institution. The assessment surcharge is a surcharge that is assigned to
an institution that has been assigned a ‘stage’ rating pursuant to the
Guide to Intervention for Federally Regulated Deposit-Taking Institutions or in accordance with the principles set out in the Guide. The
amount of the assessment surcharge is determined by regulation.”
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the institution for the purpose of implementing measures
designed to improve the bank’s safety and soundness;105
require the bank to increase its capital; impose business
restrictions in appropriate circumstances, and/or issue a
direction of compliance.106
CDIC would not normally intervene at Stage 1, but it may
request additional information from OSFI or the bank,
communicate its concerns, and place the bank on a watchlist.
In some circumstances, CDIC may conduct or commission a
special examination to assess the extent of the institution’s
problem and CDIC’s exposure. It may levy a premium
surcharge, after consulting with the Superintendent and giving
the bank an opportunity to make written representations.107
CDIC can require the bank to have in place appropriate,
effective and prudent practices with respect to corporate
governance and risk management.108 CDIC may also request
that the bank or entity that controls the bank provide an
undertaking to rectify areas of concern. There is ongoing
105 Ibid. “A prudential agreement is an agreement between the
institution and the Superintendent for the purpose of implementing
any measure designed to maintain or improve the safety and
soundness of the institution.”
106 Ibid. “A Direction of Compliance is a direction issued to an
institution, or a person with respect to an institution, by the
Superintendent where in its opinion, the institution or person is
committing, or is about to commit, an act that is an unsafe or
unsound practice in conducting the business of the institution or is
pursuing or is about to pursue any course of conduct that is an
unsafe or unsound practice in conducting the business of the
institution. A Direction of Compliance may direct an institution or
person to: cease or refrain from committing an act or pursuing a
course of conduct; and/or perform such acts as in the opinion of the
Superintendent are necessary to remedy the situation.”
107 Ibid. “A premium surcharge is an additional premium charged to a
member institution, where, in the opinion of CDIC, the member is
engaging in a practice that is prescribed in the CDIC by-laws as
warranting such an additional premium. The amount of the
premium surcharge must be fair in the circumstances and in no
case, can it exceed an amount equal to one sixth of one per cent of
the member’s insured deposits for the year.”
108 Ibid.
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cooperation between the financial regulator and resolution
authority.109
ii. Stage 2 — risk to financial viability or solvency
A bank is placed in Stage 2 if OSFI has determined that it
poses material safety and soundness concerns and is vulnerable
to adverse business and economic conditions. 110 It has
identified problems that could deteriorate into a serious
situation if not addressed promptly, although there is not an
immediate threat to solvency. OSFI considers whether the
following are present: the combination of the institution’s
overall net risk, capital and earnings makes it vulnerable to
adverse business and economic conditions or there are risk
management issues that, although not serious enough to
present an immediate threat to financial viability or solvency,
could deteriorate into more serious problems if not addressed
promptly.111
At this stage of risk, OSFI may enhance monitoring of
remedial measures through imposing more frequent or
expanded reporting requirements and supervisory reviews.
OSFI can require the bank to incorporate in its business plan
appropriate remedial measures aimed at rectifying problems
within a specified time frame. It may require the institution’s
external auditor to enlarge its scope of review of the financial
statements and/or to perform other procedures and prepare a
report. It can require a special audit to be performed by an
auditor other than the institution’s external auditor.112 OSFI
informs CDIC of results and data obtained from enhanced
monitoring and audits.
109 OSFI informs CDIC that it is staging the institution, the reasons
why, and action that OSFI is planning to take, sending it
intervention reports. CDIC notifies OSFI if it places a bank on
the watchlist and/or contemplates that it will apply remedial
measures to the institution. OSFI and CDIC hold frequent meetings
to discuss the risk profile of the institution. Ibid.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
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CDIC’s role is more active at Stage 2. It may send the chief
executive officer or the board chair a formal report pursuant to
section 30 of the CDICA if the bank is not in compliance with a
CDIC by-law or is in breach of its policy of deposit insurance. It
can require that the institution has in place appropriate, effective
and prudent practices with respect to corporate governance, risk
management, liquidity, and capital management and controls.113
If CDIC is not satisfied with progress made in rectifying the
situation, CDIC must inform the member institution and the
Minister, and CDIC may, subject to the Minister’s advice that it is
not in the public interest to do so, terminate the member
institution’s policy of deposit insurance on 30 days’ notice. This
ability to terminate gives CDIC more authority in working with
the at-risk bank, as it prevents the bank from seeking new
deposits. Deposits existing pre-cancellation of insurance are still
protected by the deposit insurance fund if a bank’s deposit
insurance policy has been cancelled.
CDIC may also conduct a preparatory examination if it
believes that making a payment in respect of deposits held by a
bank is imminent and that it would be in the best interest of the
depositors.114 It can apply to court for an order directing the
bank to comply with, or restrain from breaching, the CDICA,
CDIC’s by-laws and/or the policy of deposit insurance.115
OSFI and CDIC may also commence contingency planning to
enable the regulator or the resolution authority to be ready to
take control of the bank’s assets or the bank itself in case of
rapid deterioration. The Superintendent takes control,
temporarily or permanently, and then hires an agent, usually
an accounting firm with resolution skills, who takes actual
control as liquidator, usually simultaneously seeking a
winding-up order from the Minister. Liquidation is discussed
in Part IV below. The statute allows for return of control to the
bank, but that power is unlikely to be exercised because, by the
113 Ibid.
114 With the approval of the Superintendent, ibid.
115 Ibid.
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time the situation is serious enough to take control, it is unlikely
that there is any confidence left in the pre-intervention
governance of the bank.
iii. Stage 3 — future financial viability in serious doubt
If the institution has failed to remedy problems identified at
Stage 2 and the situation is deteriorating, OSFI can place the
bank at Stage 3. The bank now has severe safety and soundness
concerns and is experiencing problems that pose a material
threat to its future financial viability.116 One or more of the
following conditions are present: the combination of the
institution’s overall net risk, capital and earnings makes it
vulnerable to adverse business and economic conditions or
there are management or control deficiencies that pose a serious
threat to its financial viability or solvency unless corrective
action is promptly undertaken.117 At Stage 3, OSFI may direct
external specialists to assess the quality of loan security, asset
values and sufficiency of reserves; enhance the scope of business
restrictions that have already been imposed and/or require the
bank to submit more detailed information.118 OSFI staff may
be placed at the institution to monitor the situation on an
ongoing basis. OSFI may expand contingency planning and
communicate to the bank’s management and board of directors
the importance of considering resolution options such as
restructuring or seeking a prospective purchaser.119
CDIC at Stage 3 can act to minimize its exposure to loss by
taking such measures as acquiring assets from the member
institution, or making or guaranteeing loans or advances, with
or without security.120 CDIC and OSFI communicate more
often and have regular meetings of the FISC to discuss the
evolving situation and undertake contingency planning.121
116
117
118
119
120
121

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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iv. Stage 4 — non-viability / insolvency is imminent
Most serious is Stage 4, where OSFI has determined that the
bank is experiencing severe financial difficulties and has
deteriorated to such an extent that it has failed to meet
regulatory capital requirements, has failed to develop and
implement an acceptable business plan to address capital
requirements, and is unable to rectify the situation
immediately. At this stage, the statutory conditions for taking
control have been met.122 OSFI has determined that the
financial institution will become non-viable on an imminent
basis. OSFI may assume temporary or permanent control of
the bank’s assets or assets under administration or the
institution itself once the statutory conditions for taking
control of assets exist.123 However, if the Minister advises
OSFI that it is not in the public interest to do so, OFSI will not
take control. Where the assets and/or the institution are under
OFSI’s control, it can ask the Attorney General of Canada to
make a winding-up order.124
At Stage 4, in addition to actions available at earlier stages,
CDIC may cancel the banks’ policy of deposit insurance if it
determines that the bank is, or is about to become, insolvent,
after notifying OSFI and subject to the Minister’s advice that it
is not in the public interest to do so.125
CDIC can also initiate its financial institution restructuring
authority or seek a winding-up of the bank, meeting certain
specified requirements, as discussed in Part IV. Here, there is
some overlap, in that OSFI and CDIC can both take over
control of the bank. How it will work in practice is not
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid. CDIC, “Working with other members of the Canadian
government’s financial safety net”, online: CDIC 5http://www.cdic.ca/en/about-cdic/partners/Pages/financial-safety-net.aspx4.
125 CDIC may give public notice of the termination or cancellation of
the bank’s policy of deposit insurance through any news media that
it considers appropriate, if, in CDIC’s opinion, it is in the public
interest to do so. Ibid.
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particularly transparent. OSFI could take control and hand it
over to CDIC to resolve the bank with support from OSFI and
other agencies as needed.
The few times that OSFI has exercised this authority
involved smaller banks and it took control as a means of
quickly winding-up the bank. The CDIC resolution authority
may be aimed more at D-SIB where going-concern bank
resolution is least harmful to the overall financial system. OSFI
and CDIC must cooperate, and the fact that OSFI and the
Department of Finance have statutorily designated
representatives on the CDIC board of directors makes it less
likely that there are decision gaps or lack of information
exchange. However, it is unclear as to what body is to act at
Stage 4 and when. There can also be a tension between the
regulators and the largest creditors of the bank, in that secured
creditors may want a different process depending on the speed
at which they may get paid out.
As at 31 March 2017, there were 20 staged institutions. With
a few exceptions, most of the staged institutions were in the
early warning Stage 1 category.126
IV. CANADA’S BANK RESOLUTION REGIME —
SUPPORTING STRUCTURE
Unlike many countries in which the regulator is also the bank
resolution authority, that authority is now officially vested in
CDIC effective June 2017. The change occurred in a budget
amendmentbill, asopposedtotheresultoftheusualparliamentary
process. It may be that the federal government missed an
important opportunity to discuss whether or not there needs to
be a national resolution authority for financial conglomerates,
rather than having it located in many different entities.
The reason for lack of public policy discussion was likely
because CDIC was the de facto bank resolution authority
prior to it becoming named as such. In the five years prior to
126 OSFI Annual Report 2016-2017, supra note 4 at 12.
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the 2017 amendments, enhanced financial restructuring
powers, bridge-banks and bail-in were added to its tool
kit.127 CDIC had resolved mid-tier bank failures such as
Central Guaranty Trust Company and North American
Trust Company.128 Thus it had resolution experience, but
lacked tools such as the bail-in and bridge bank power that it
now has.129 CDIC’s broad authority authorizes it to act as
liquidator, receiver or inspector of a member institution or its
subsidiary, and it can appoint qualified and competent
persons to carry out these functions. 130 CDIC can acquire
assets and assume liabilities of a bank from its liquidator or
receiver; acquire, by way of security or otherwise, shares and
subordinated debt of a bank, and hold and dispose of that
equity and subordinated debt.131 CDIC repays the deposits
and then subrogates to the deposit claim. CDIC can acquire,
hold and alienate real and personal property; settle or
compromise any claim by or against CDIC; and do
anything else necessary for exercising its authority. 132 In
127 See the discussion of these tools in Part IV.
128 CDIC, “History of Failures”, supra note 47.
129 See also the discussion, infra note 180, where CDIC was given some
resolution authority under a special statute in 1986 when Bank of
British Columbia failed.
130 OSFI Annual Report 2016-2017, supra note 4.
131 Ibid. As noted above, it can also make advances to pay a claim
against an institution for which CDIC is acting as receiver or
liquidator, in respect of any insured deposit, and become subrogated as an unsecured creditor for the amount of the advance.
132 CDICA, supra note 2. Subsidiary corporations:
(2) For the purposes of facilitating the acquisition, management or
disposal of real property or other assets of a member institution that the
Corporation may acquire as the result of its operations, the Corporation
may, when authorized by order of the Governor in Council, (a) procure
the incorporation of a corporation, all the shares of which, on
incorporation, would be held by, on behalf of or in trust for the
Corporation; or (b) acquire all of the shares of a corporation that, on
acquisition, would be held by, on behalf of or in trust for the Corporation.
(3) A corporation described in paragraph (2)(a) or (b) is deemed not to be
an agent of the Corporation or of Her Majesty in right of Canada.
(3.1) A corporation described in paragraph (2)(a) or (b) may acquire assets
and assume liabilities of a member institution from that institution or
from its liquidator or receiver.
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carrying out its mandate, CDIC directors have inspection
powers.133 The costs of receivership come out of the assets of
the estate. What is significant about its new resolution
authority is that, effective June 2017, CDIC has become
responsible for the D-SIB resolution regime.
1. Domestic Systemically Important Banks (“D-SIB”) Resolution
Plans
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the FSB’s Key
Attributes report sets out the responsibilities and powers that
countries should have in place to resolve the financial distress of
large complex banks in a way that protects eligible deposits,
maintains the flow of critical financial services, protects the
economy, and minimizes risk to taxpayers.134 In November
2015, the FSB finalized the international Total Loss Absorbing
Capacity (“TLAC”) standard for all global systemically
important banks. The TLAC framework is aimed at ensuring
that a systemically important bank has sufficient loss absorbing
capacity to support its recapitalization in the event of failure
and facilitates an orderly resolution of a bank to allow it to
remain open and operating without requiring public funds or
threatening financial stability.
In designating a D-SIB, OSFI is to take into account all
relevant factors, “including whether the distress or failure of the
bank could have a significant adverse impact on the financial
system in Canada”.135 In creating its new regime, Canada
adopted many of the FSB recommendations.136 Canadian DSIB must have resolution plans that describe how they could be
resolved in an orderly manner, while ensuring the continuity of
critical financial services. Consistent with the FSB
recommendations,137 these resolution plans are to protect
133
134
135
136
137

Section 11(3), ibid.
FSB, Key Attributes, supra note 7.
Section 484.1(3), Bank Act, supra note 2.
CDIC, supra note 2.
FSB, Key Attributes, supra note 7.
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eligible deposits and maintain the flow of critical financial
services.138 CDIC is to provide guidance and work with the
banks to: ensure the plans are realistic and meet the objectives
of resolution; review and assess resolution plans for feasibility;
address any obstacles that would prevent the orderly resolution
of the bank in a crisis event; and ensure its own capacity to
implement the plan if needed.139 The purpose of a resolution
plan is to allow CDIC to resolve a financial institution in an
orderly manner that will maintain stability of the economy and
protect taxpayers from exposure to loss. 140 The D-SIB
submitted their first resolution plans in late 2016, and CDIC
reviewed and assessed these plans, providing feedback
regarding gaps in potential resolvability.141 CDIC conducts
simulations to enhance preparedness to carry out a resolution.
CDIC is working with D-SIB to ensure that all have robust
resolution plans in place by 2020.142 In fall 2017, it will lead
crisis management group meetings to discuss cross-border
impediments to D-SIB resolvability.143
CDIC has set out the following principles to guide D-SIB in
the development of their resolution plans:
Accountable: The bank’s board of directors is responsible for ensuring
that a credible and feasible resolution plan is in place and can be
operationally implemented.

138 Ibid. See also FSB, “Recovery and Resolution Planning for Systemically Important Financial Institutions: Guidance on Developing
Effective Resolution Strategies” (16 July 2013), online: FSB 5http://
www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_130716b.pdf?page_moved=14
[“FSB, Guidance on Developing Effective Resolution Strategies”].
139 CDIC, “Resolution Plan Guidance (Summary)”, online: CDIC
5http://www.cdic.ca/en/financial-community/legislation-bylaws/
Documents/summary-cdic-resolution-plan-guidance.pdf4 [“CDIC,
Resolution Plan Guidance”]. CDIC also works closely with its
foreign counterparts via the International Association of Deposit
Insurers by contributing to the development of best practices.
140 Ibid.
141 CDIC Annual Report 2017, supra note 22 at 16.
142 Ibid at 19.
143 Ibid at 30.
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Strategic: The plan must be strategically focused, reflecting senior
management’s conclusions about implementation, given the bank’s
legal, financial and operational structure.
Comprehensive: Resolution plans must take into account the specific
characteristics of the bank, including its size, complexity and geographic
footprint.
Implementable: Each plan must demonstrate practical implementation,
including the extent to which crisis management capabilities have been,
or can be, tested.
Current: Resolution planning is an iterative process that requires regular
updating to reflect the current state of the bank, as well as the legal and
regulatory environment in which it operates. Banks must detail and
remedy any major impediments to the successful implementation of their
plans.144

If a D-SIB fails, CDIC is responsible for selecting and
implementing a resolution strategy, taking into account the
circumstances.145 CDIC’s guidance is a “blueprint” for a
comprehensive resolution plan, and each bank’s resolution
plan serves as a guide to help achieve an orderly resolution in
the event the bank is at risk of non-viability or insolvency. The
banks are required to ensure that the resolution plans are
robust and current in terms of feasibility.146 The D-SIB must
provide CDIC with extensive information about their
operations to assess the means by which their legal, financial
and operating structure can facilitate an orderly resolution of a
range of severe but plausible events. This information includes
corporate profile, strategies to ensure continuation or winddown of material operations, scenario analysis, and
operational feasibility of the strategies outlined in the plan. 147
It is unclear if OSFI or CDIC has the authority to compel
significant structural changes to a D-SIB if there are concerns
about resolvability identified through the process of crafting
resolution plans. However, the other tools at their disposal
under the early intervention authority, such as requiring the
144
145
146
147

CDIC, Resolution Plan Guidance, supra note 139.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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bank to carry more capital in Canada, are an effective tool for
getting the D-SIB to take seriously the need for a resolution
strategy.
The Canadian legislation and guidance align with FSB
guidance on operational continuity, loss absorbency, funding,
cross-border cooperation, effective resolution strategies, and
the removal of obstacles to resolvability.148 CDIC’s goal is also
to develop and roll out resolution plans for mid-tier banks by
2018.149
2. CDICA Resolution Tools
CDIC’s resolution tools undergird the stability of the
financial system. They include reimbursement of insured
deposits, and financial institution restructuring powers,
including forced sale, bridge banks and bail-in. Its open bank
resolution approach reflects a strong commitment to
continuing the bank’s financial services and protecting
depositors’ savings, whether or not the bank continues in its
current form or its business is transferred to another bank.
CDIC’s ex ante funding is a measure of its ability to fund
interventions; the balance stood at $3.8 billion as at 31 March
2017.150 CDIC has developed a funding plan that builds the ex
ante funding to a minimum funding target in approximately
eight years.151
i. Reimbursement of insured deposits
When a failed bank is closed, it ceases to operate, all contracts
are terminated and its critical financial services are no longer
available. CDIC has what it calls a “rapid reimbursement
148 FSB, Guidance on Developing Effective Resolution Strategies, supra
note 138, British Bankers’ Association, “Recovery and Resolution
Planning: Making the Key Attributes Requirements Operational”,
online: FSB 5http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/c_121218d.pdf4.
149 CDIC Annual Report 2017, supra note 22 at 17-18.
150 Ibid at 23, plus the borrowing power discussed earlier.
151 Ibid at 25. As at 30 April 2016, the 100 basis point minimum target
level would amount to $7,413 million.
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process” so that insured depositors receive their money as soon
as possible, without depositors having to file a claim.152 Its
target for rapid payment is within one week. As noted earlier,
CDIC will reimburse insured deposits up to $100,000, including
interest.153 Registered retirement savings plan (“RRSP”)
accounts will take longer, as a ruling will be required from
Canada Revenue Agency in order to transfer the RRSP to
another financial institution without losing the tax benefits.154
Speedy payment drives confidence in the deposit insurance
scheme, and in this respect, the pre-funding of the deposit
insurance fund is very important.
Depositors with funds that are not protected by CDIC file a
claim as a creditor in the bank’s liquidation.155
ii. Financial institution restructuring powers
The CDICA authorizes financial institution restructuring
power (“FIRP”).156 Whether or not there exists a willing buyer
152 CDIC, “Resolution Tools”, online: CDIC 5http://www.cdic.ca/en/
about-cdic/resolution/Pages/tools.aspx4 [“CDIC, Resolution
Tools”].
153 The reimbursement is per insurance category in accordance with the
following payment schedule: CDIC would aim to reimburse
chequing and savings accounts, joint accounts and mortgage tax
accounts within three business days from the date of failure.
Deposits in valid trusts are protected to $100,000 per beneficiary.
CDIC would contact broker-trustees to inform them of its process
to reimburse insured deposits. CDIC would remit payment to
broker-trustees within seven business days of receiving wire
transfer/payment information. Payment would be based on CDIC
calculations and deposit information at the failed institution. CDIC
would hold registered deposits in RRSP, RRIF and TFSA for
several days while it works with the Canada Revenue Agency to
ensure they remain tax-sheltered. CDIC would contact these
depositors directly to inform them of next steps.
154 These accounts have special identifiers, to ensure they are appropriately protected in the transfer.
155 CDIC, Resolution Tools, supra note 152.
156 Section 39.1, CDICA, supra note 2. FIRP means the institution
restructuring provisions of the CDICA whereby an order may be
made by the Governor in Council, on the recommendation of the
Minister, to vest the shares and subordinated debt of a federal

292 / Resolving Bank Financial Distress in Canada

for all or part of a non-viable bank, CDIC can take control of
and operate the bank for a short period of time to complete its
sale, amalgamation or restructuring without shareholder
approval. It allows continuation of critical banking
operations and protects insured deposits until a private sector
transaction is complete.157
CDIC reports that a forced sale would be used when
shareholder consent of the transaction is not expected or the
time to obtain consent would take too long.158 CDIC can
initiate a FIRP following receipt of OSFI’s report that a bank
has ceased, or is about to cease, to be viable, and viability
cannot be restored by exercise of OSFI’s powers under the
Bank Act.159 The bank must be given a reasonable opportunity
to make representations before any action is taken.160 Factors
that the OSFI will consider are: whether the bank is dependent
to an excessive extent on loans, advances, guarantees or other
financial assistance to sustain its operations; whether it has lost
the confidence of depositors and the public; whether the bank’s
regulatory capital, within the meaning of the Bank Act, is about
to become substantially deficient; or the bank has failed to pay
or will not be able to pay its liabilities as they become due and
payable.161

157

158
159
160
161

member institution in CDIC and/or appoint CDIC as receiver of
the member for purposes of carrying out a transaction or a series of
transactions to restructure a substantial part of the business of the
member. The tools include bridge bank provisions.
CDIC, “Forced Sale—Financial Institution Restructuring Powers”,
online: CDIC 5http://www.cdic.ca/en/about-cdic/resolution/Pages/
forced-sale-financial-institution-restructuring-powers-firp.aspx4
[“CDIC, Financial Institution Restructuring Powers”].
Ibid.
Sections 39.1(3), (4), CDICA, supra note 2. The report can be
written or oral, depending on the urgency.
Section 39.1(1), ibid.
Section 39.1(2), ibid. CDIC can then, if it determines that a
transaction referred to in s 39.2 is reasonably likely to be
expeditiously carried out after the making of the order, request
the Minister to recommend that one or more orders be made under
s 39.13.
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CDIC’s board reviews options to address the bank’s nonviability, considering whether a restructuring transaction is
likely to be quickly carried out, and whether such transaction is
consistent with CDIC’s statutory objectives. 162 CDIC
recommends the best resolution approach for the failing bank
to the Minister of Finance; who in turn recommends a
resolution approach to the Governor in Council (“GIC”).
The GIC makes an order authorizing the FIRP if it is likely that
a restructuring transaction can be expeditiously entered into.163
The order can vest the shares and subordinated debt of the bank
in the receiver, can place a D-SIB under the bridge bank
provisions, or require CDIC to apply for a winding-up order if
it is in the public interest.164 There are two forms of FIRP, a
“share FIRP” or an “asset FIRP”.165 The GIC may make
orders for one or both types of FIRP.
In a share FIRP, the shares and subordinated debt of the
distressed bank are vested in CDIC and CDIC has temporary
share ownership and control of the bank. CDIC can transfer the
shares to an acquirer or agree to the amalgamation of the bank
with another financial institution.166 These transactions could
be preceded by restructuring or other measures to stabilize the
bank’s operations. As sole shareholder, CDIC can replace the
existing board of directors, which in turn can select
replacements for senior management as appropriate. CDIC
162 CDIC’s Board is made up of a Chairperson, five private sector
directors and five ex officio directors: the Governor of the Bank of
Canada, the Deputy Minister of Finance, the Commissioner of the
Financial Consumer Agency of Canada, the Superintendent of
Financial Institutions, and a Deputy Superintendent of Financial
Institutions or another officer of OSFI appointed by the Minister of
Finance. CDIC Annual Report 2017, supra note 22 at 69.
163 CDIC, Financial Institution Restructuring Powers, supra note 157.
CDIC may also apply for a winding-up order under the WURA,
supra note 35, where it believes the bank is or is about to become
insolvent, unless the Minister advises that it would not be in the
public interest to do so, as discussed in Part IV.
164 Sections 39.12, 39.13, 39.22, CDICA, supra note 2.
165 Sections 39.1, 39.12, 39.13, ibid.
166 Section 39.2, ibid.
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can also exercise the powers of directors and officers. During
CDIC’s temporary control, a separate workout company can
be created to purchase “impaired” assets and to assume certain
liabilities of the member institution. The workout company
could be a subsidiary of CDIC. The institution would transfer
such assets and liabilities to the workout company under the
terms of a “purchase and assumption agreement”.167
CDIC’s ability to take control does not extend to the bank’s
subsidiaries if they are not also CDIC members, nor do CDIC’s
resolution powers apply to holding companies of CDIC
member institutions that are not themselves member
institutions.168 However, CDIC can transfer, or cause to have
transferred, the shares and assets of direct and indirect
subsidiaries, subject to regulatory and other third-party
approval.169
In an asset FIRP, CDIC is appointed receiver in respect of
the distressed bank.170 Temporary control is taken to stabilize
the financial institution’s operations and then effect a
transaction. The powers and duties of directors and officers
of the financial institution, and the rights and privileges of
shareholders to vote or give approvals, are also suspended.
CDIC can exercise these powers. Existing shareholders and
subordinated-debt holders continue to own shares and
subordinated debt in the financial institution. 171 As receiver,
CDIC has broad authority to take possession and control. It
can sell the unsecured assets; sell or otherwise dispose of any
secured asset to any person who agrees to assume the
obligation secured by the security interest. It can arrange for
assumption by another person or entity of all or part of its
liabilities, or both. CDIC can conduct an amalgamation. It
can carry on the business to the extent it deems is necessary or
beneficial, sue for, defend, compromise and settle, in the name
167
168
169
170
171

Sections 39.1 (3), 39.14, ibid.
Section 39.15, ibid.
Ibid.
Section 39.13, ibid.
Section 39.2(1), ibid.
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of the bank, any claim made by or against it;172 and undertake
any other transactions that restructure the bank’s business. 173
On notice, the CDIC can convert shares and liabilities, setting
the timing, terms and conditions of the conversion. 174 As
receiver, CDIC can exercise its powers, rights, privileges and
immunities without approval of the court, but may seek the
assistance of the superior court to give effect to those powers,
rights, privileges and immunities. 175 The costs of the
receivership come from the assets of the bank. 176
As with a share FIRP, in an asset FIRP, CDIC has authority
to cause the financial institution to transfer assets and
liabilities to a workout company. CDIC could also leave
some part of the failing bank’s business behind in a stub entity,
172 Section 39.22, ibid. As well as do what is necessary or incidental to
the exercise of the CDIC’s rights, powers, privileges and immunities
as receiver.
173 Sections 39.2(2), 39.2(2.1), ibid.
174 Sections 39.2(2.3), (2.4), (2.5), ibid.
Novation (6) Any person who assumes a liability of the federal member
institution under a transaction referred to in subsection (1) or (2) becomes
liable—instead of the federal member institution—to discharge the
liability, on approval of the transaction by the Minister or as soon as
the person assumes the liability if the transaction does not require the
Minister’s approval.
(7) Subsection (6) does not apply to the bridge institution’s assumption of
any portion of the federal member institution’s liability that is not insured
by the Corporation.
(8) A trust company within the meaning of subsection 57(2) of the Trust
and Loan Companies Act that is designated as a bridge institution may
become a trustee in substitution for the federal member institution
without formality or the consent of any beneficiary of the trust.
(9) The conversion of shares or liabilities under subsection (2.3) (a) subject
to paragraph (b), extinguishes any claim, interest or right in respect of the
shares or liabilities, or part of them, that were converted; and (b) does not
extinguish any claim to the extent that the claim is a personal claim against
a person other than the Corporation, the federal member institution or a
person claiming under the Corporation or the federal member institution.

175 Section 39.13(5), ibid. Section 39.13 also includes environmental
liability and remediation and successor employer provisions.
176 Section 39.13, ibid. Shares and subordinated debt that are subject to
the receivership that are vested in a trustee under the Bankruptcy
and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3, as amended [BIA] are vested in
CDIC.
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with the result that it would be liquidated, while other parts of
the business would be continued by a third-party acquirer.
CDIC control is terminated on completion of the restructuring
transactions or the expiration of the statutory period of 60
days, with possible extension up to a maximum of 180 days.
CDIC applies for a winding-up order in respect of the bank
under the WURA, as discussed in Part IV.3, if it believes the
transactions cannot be substantially completed before the end
of that period.
The FIRP authority is extensive, because unlike a Companies’
Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) 177 restructuring
proceeding, the CDIC does not have to seek court approval for
a whole range of actions. That authority allows it to act quickly if
needed. In terms of the accountability check that a courtsupervised process would normally provide, underpinning the
regime is the principle that no creditor should be worse off as a
result of the resolution strategy. The FSB has suggested that the
safeguards to the bank resolution framework are “respect of
creditor hierarchy” and “no creditors worse off” principle.178
However, that broad principle may be a recipe for litigation if the
accountability check and balance on decision making is not clear.
In the US, there has been considerable litigation over the
valuation of bank assets that may be available to creditors, often
177 Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, RSC 1985, c C-36, as
amended [CCAA].
178 FSB, Key Attributes, supra note 7 at 11:
5.1 Resolution powers should be exercised in a way that respects the
hierarchy of claims while providing flexibility to depart from the general
principle of equal (pari passu) treatment of creditors of the same class,
with transparency about the reasons for such departures, if necessary to
contain the potential systemic impact of a firm’s failure or to maximise the
value for the benefit of all creditors as a whole. In particular, equity
should absorb losses first, and no loss should be imposed on senior debt
holders until subordinated debt (including all regulatory capital instruments) has been written-off entirely (whether or not that loss-absorption
through write-down is accompanied by conversion to equity).
5.2 Creditors should have a right to compensation where they do not
receive at a minimum what they would have received in a liquidation of
the firm under the applicable insolvency regime (‘‘no creditor worse off
than in liquidation’’ safeguard).
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involving a “battle of valuators”, consuming considerable time
and resources of all parties.179
Although the FIRP power is extensive, the current statutory
provisions have not yet been used by the CDIC, and thus are
untested. However, similar financial restructuring powers were
used when the federal government permitted HSBC to acquire
the assets of the Bank of British Columbia when it failed in 1986.
CDIC did not have express FIRP powers at the time, so
Parliament enacted special legislation, the Bank of British
Columbia Business Continuation Act, as an “Act to facilitate the
continuation of the business of the Bank of British
Columbia”.180 The statute provided that, on the approval by
the GIC of a sale agreement, the purchasing bank was to pay
into a trust account designated by CDIC and the failing bank
the amount of money payable under the sale agreement by the
purchasing bank.181 The sale agreement had to be submitted to
the shareholders of the distressed bank at a special meeting
called for the purpose of determining whether shareholders
approved the consideration obtained for the assets sold.182
Failing majority shareholder approval, the GIC could appoint
an assessor to assess the net realizable value of assets, taking
into account the likelihood of viability of the bank absent
completion of the sale.183 Where the assessor determined that
179 Daniel C Hardy, “IMF Working Paper 13/172: Bank Resolution
Costs, Depositor Preference, and Asset Encumbrance” (July 2013),
online: IMF 5https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/
wp13172.pdf4.
180 Bank of British Columbia Business Continuation Act, SC 1986, c 47,
assented to 27 November 1986.
181 Ibid, s 7.
182 Ibid, s 8(1). Section 9(1) specified that at the meeting of the
shareholders, the resolution referred to carried by a majority of the
votes cast by the shareholders present in person or represented by
proxy at the meeting, the trust amount would forthwith be released
to the bank.
183 Ibid, s 9(3):
As soon as practicable after his appointment, the assessor shall determine
(a) as of the day immediately before this Act comes into force, the net
realizable value, if any, of the assets less the obligations of the Bank,
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the net value was an amount equal to or greater than the
aggregate of the trust amount plus the net retained value, the
amounts in the trust were paid out to the distressed bank and
CDIC was responsible for paying any difference in the value. If
the assessment was less than amounts in trust, the bank was
given the portion of the trust amount determined to be the net
value less the net retained value and the remaining amounts
were to be paid out to CDIC.184 The Minister then authorized
dissolution of the old bank. Pursuant to this statute, the bank’s
financial activities and the deposits were stabilized and HSBC
(then “HBC”) acquired an additional $2.6 billion in assets and
41 branches in British Columbia and Alberta.185
It is an early example of bank resolution using financial
restructuring powers in a speedy and effective way where
shareholders of the failing bank do not agree to a sale. However,
the use of these powers was not without controversy. During
parliamentary debates, concern was expressed about the office
of the Inspector General’s failure to provide early warning of
hereinafter in this section referred to as the ‘‘net value’’; and (b) any net
realizable value of the assets and obligations retained by the Bank under
the sale agreement, hereinafter in this section referred to as the ‘‘net
retained value.’’

Under s 9(4), the assessor is to take account of the likelihood, in the
absence of the sale agreement, of profitability and continuing
viability of the bank as an independent bank; of sale of the assets of
the bank other than to the purchasing bank; and of the appointment
of a curator or the winding-up of the business of the bank.
184 Ibid, s 9(8). Where the assessor determined that the net value was an
amount equal to or greater than the aggregate of the trust amount
plus the net retained value, (a) the trust amount was to be forthwith
released to the Bank; and (b) to the extent that it was greater than
that aggregate, the Corporation was to forthwith pay to the Bank
the difference between the greater amount and that aggregate.
(9) Where the assessor determines that the net value is an amount
less than the aggregate of the trust amount plus the net retained
value, there shall forthwith be released, (a) to the Bank such portion
of the trust amount as was determined to be the net value less the
net retained value; and (b) to the Corporation the remainder of the
trust amount.
185 Patricia Chisholm, “End of a dream for Bank of BC”, Financial
Times of Canada (1 December 1986) at 8, 59.
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the Bank of British Columbia’s unsound bank loan portfolio;
concern that a foreign bank was receiving significant assets,
including CDIC insurance of $200 million, without being asked
for any commitment; and concern about CDIC’s independent
decision-making given the public nature of the transaction in
terms of government cash injections.186
iii. Bridge banks
The bridge bank provisions are another tool in the FIRP
authority. When OSFI determines that a bank is non-viable,
CDIC can establish a bridge institution for a temporary period,
also referred to as a bridge bank in this article.187 The bridge bank
is aimed at preserving going-concern value when there is no
buyer or private-sector solution available at the time of the
bank’s failure. Bridge bank resolution spans the time from when
a bank fails to completion of a sale of the bridge bank or its assets.
186 House of Commons Debates, 33rd Parl, 2nd Sess, Vol 2 (26 November
1986) at 1552-1570 (Hon Tom Hockin, Minister of State (Finance), et
al), online: Canadian Parliamentary Historical Resources 5http://
parl.canadiana.ca/view/oop.debates_HOC3302_02/162?r=0&s=34.
The initial debate considering Bill C-27, An Act to facilitate the
continuation of the business of the Bank of British Columbia, put
forward in response to the Bank of British Columbia’s (“BBC”)
financial issues. The House debated the role of CDIC in the BBC crisis
as well as with other banks in the recent past. House of Commons
Debates, 33rd Parl, 2nd Sess, Vol 2 (27 November 1986) at 1573-1584,
1598-1609 (Hon Jean-Robert Gauthier, et al), online: Canadian
Parliamentary Historical Resources 5http://parl.canadiana.ca/view/
oop.debates_HOC3302_02/183?r=0&s=34.
187 Ibid. CDIC, “Bridge Bank Resolution”, online: CDIC 5http://
www.cdic.ca/en/about-cdic/resolution/Pages/bridge-bank.aspx4
[“CDIC, Bridge Bank Resolution”]. CDIC illustrates how a bridge
bank scenario would likely unfold: CDIC would be appointed as
receiver of the failed institution; the Minister would be directed to
incorporate a bridge bank; the letters patent incorporating the
bridge bank would be made on a Friday night after the close of the
Large Value Transfer System clearing cycle. The bridge bank, which
would be a new legal entity wholly owned by CDIC, would be
authorized by the Superintendent to commence and carry on
business immediately on Friday. The GIC may exempt a bridge
institution from the application of any provision of the Bank Act or
certain other statutes.
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CDIC can use a bridge bank to transfer all or part of the failing
bank’s business. The bank is temporarily owned by CDIC.188
Without delay after an order is made to designate a bridge
institution and specify the date and time as of which the
distressed bank’s deposit liabilities are assumed, the Minister is
to issue letters patent incorporating it as a federal institution.189
Then the Superintendent makes an order approving the
commencement and carrying on of business by the bridge
bank. CDIC must provide the financial assistance that a bridge
bank needs to discharge its obligations as they become due,
drawing from its investment portfolio, and, if needed,
exercising its borrowing authority under the CDICA.190
In such cases, CDIC must transfer all insured deposits and
can transfer other assets and liabilities of the failing institution
to the bridge bank to aid in the bridge bank’s viability or
preserve financial stability. A bridge bank is colloquially the
“good bank”, leaving the stub of the failing financial
institution. Other assets and liabilities, including “bad
assets” that are not critical, and certain liabilities such as
subordinated debt, can be left behind in the failed bank, which
is subsequently liquidated in a court-supervised process.
Creditors left behind in the bank would receive their
proportionate share of the value of assets recovered on
liquidation. CDIC could decide to only transfer the assets
and liabilities necessary to preserve essential services, or could
transfer all assets and liabilities to keep the institution whole.
Once CDIC has substantially transferred the assets and
liabilities to a bridge bank, it would apply for a winding-up
order of the failed institution under the WURA.191
188 CDIC, Financial Institution Restructuring Powers, supra note 157.
189 Section 39.371, CDICA, supra note 2. The letters patent are issued
under whichever statute regulates the federal member institution,
supra note 2; the Cooperative Credit Associations Act, supra note 30;
or the Trust and Loan Companies Act, supra note 100.
190 Section 39.3713, CDICA, ibid, except for its obligations to the CDIC.
191 Section 39.22(1), ibid. CDIC is to apply for a winding-up order in
respect of a federal member institution under the WURA, supra

Annual Review of Insolvency Law / 301

The key objectives of a bridge bank are to maintain critical
financial services, ensure deposits are protected, and continue
operations that are important for financial stability, minimizing
disruption to the financial system.192 CDIC has the authority to
remove and replace the failing bank’s board of directors.193 It
can give directions to the board of directors of a bridge bank, and
the directors must ensure the directions are implemented in a
prompt and efficient manner, notifying CDIC when
implemented.194 CDIC may direct the board of directors of a
bridge bank to, or the board may, on its own motion with
approval of CDIC, make, amend or repeal any by-law.195
The objective is to return the bridge bank to the private sector
as soon as possible through one or more transactions such as
sale of the bank to a third party or amalgamation with an
existing bank.196 The return to private control must happen
note 35, if a notice has not been published under s 39.2(3) in respect
of the institution on or before the 60th day after the day on which
the order is made under s 39.13(1); or the day on which any
extension of that period ends. Extensions of that time can be
granted in some circumstances under s 39.22:
(3) The Governor in Council may, by order made on the recommendation
of the Minister, grant one or more extensions of the period set out in
subsection (1)—of up to 30 days each—but the last extension must expire
not later than 180 days after the day on which the order is made under
subsection 39.13(1).
(4) The Governor in Council may, by order made on the recommendation
of the Minister, grant one or more extensions of the applicable period set
out in subsection (1.1)—of up to one year each—but the last extension
must expire not later than five years after the day on which the order is
made under subsection 39.13(1).

192
193
194
195
196

Under s 39.22(1.1), where an order is made under ss 39.13(1)(d) or
39.13(1.3), CDIC is to apply for a winding-up order in respect of the
institution under the WURA.
CDIC, Financial Institution Restructuring Powers, supra note 157.
CDIC, Bridge Bank Resolution, supra note 187.
Section 39.3721, CDICA, supra note 2.
Section 39.3722, ibid.
Given its temporary nature, it is expected that the pricing of loans
and deposits at the bridge bank and various fees would be roughly
equivalent to industry norms. Sections 39.371-39.3722, ibid, Creation and Operation of Bridge Institutions.
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within two years,197 although the GIC can grant up to three
extensions of one-year each, to a maximum existence of five
years.198 The time period allows for “cleaning-up” and
marketing the institution, and provides a reasonable window
for prospective acquirers to conduct their due diligence.
However, the UK experience with major banks shows that it
can take longer than five years. After the end of the relevant
time period, the bank would cease to be designated as a bridge
bank. The tool is available when it is determined by the CDIC
board, the Minister of Finance and the GIC that it is important
that the bank not be closed, considering financial stability and
confidence in the financial system, execution risks, costs, and
exposure to and size of the loss.199
The bridge bank as a resolution tool is suited for banks that
deteriorate rapidly with little notice, a potential buyer has not
emerged and there are financial stability concerns.200 The
bridge bank can stabilize deposits and stabilize the situation for
all creditors that are passed to a bridge bank.201 All creditors
passed to the bridge bank are to receive full and uninterrupted
access to their funds. CDIC is to establish the terms and
conditions of the transaction, the consideration to be paid for
assets acquired, and which liabilities the bridge bank will
assume and the consideration to be paid for the liabilities
197 Section 39.3711 (1), ibid.
198 Section 39.3711 (1) and (2), ibid:
(1) Subject to section 39.3715, the federal institution referred to in
subsection 39.371(1) is designated as a bridge institution for a period of
two years.
(2) The Governor in Council may, by order, on the recommendation of
the Minister, grant up to three extensions—of one year each—of the
period referred to in subsection (1).
Section 39.3715: A federal institution’s designation as a bridge institution
terminates if (a) the Corporation is no longer the sole shareholder; or (b)
the federal institution is amalgamated with a body corporate that is not a
bridge institution.

199 Ibid.
200 CDIC, Bridge Bank Resolution, supra note 187.
201 Ibid.

Annual Review of Insolvency Law / 303

assumed. 202 Consideration is to be reasonable in the
circumstances.203
Where created, a bridge bank must assume the member
institution’s deposit liabilities that are insured by CDIC and
posted in the bank’s records, assuming any interest accrued. 204
The statute also deems deposits and withdrawals made but not
posted in the transition to be the responsibility of the bridge
bank.205 If the bridge bank assumes any portion of a bank’s
liability that is not insured by CDIC, the bridge bank is
subrogated to all the rights and interests of the creditor against
the institution in relation to the liability, and may maintain an
action in respect of those rights and interests in its own name or
in the name of the creditor.206 In this situation, as soon as the
bridge bank receives an amount equal to the liabilities CDIC
assumed that are not insured, the rights and interests in respect
of the balance remaining revert to the creditor.207 Specified
security rights are transferable.208
When an order is made to establish a bridge bank, the
CDICA imposes a broad general stay of proceedings, similar to
the stay available under insolvency legislation.209 The stay
202
203
204
205
206
207
208

Section 39.201(1), CDICA, supra note 2.
Section 39.201(2), ibid.
Sections 39.202(1) and (1.1), ibid.
Sections 39.202(1.2) and (1.3), ibid.
Section 39.202(2), ibid.
Section 39.202(3), ibid.
Section 39.21, ibid:
If the assets that are sold under a transaction described in section 39.2 or
by a bank designated as a bridge institution include any outstanding
security under section 426 or 427 of the Bank Act, the buyer of the assets
may hold the security for the life of the loan to which the security relates
and all the provisions of that Act relating to the security and its
enforcement continue to apply to the buyer as though the buyer were a
bank.

209 Section 39.15(1), ibid, including a stay on civil proceedings, other
than a proceeding under the WURA, supra note 35; on attachment,
garnishment, execution or other method of enforcement of a
judgment; creditor remedies; most rights of set-off (except in the
normal course of clearing and settlement processes); on terminating
agreements and conversion of shares.
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allows sufficient time to stabilize the situation and set up the
bridge bank. The scope of the stay is very broad and includes a
stay on all civil proceedings, arbitration, termination of
agreements, acceleration of payments, garnishment,
execution or other method of enforcement of a judgment, all
creditor actions and remedies, and many rights of set-off.210
The stay is for a period of 90 days from the day on which the
bridge bank acquires the asset or assumes the liability.211 If an
agreement with a bank is assigned to or assumed by a bridge
bank or a third party, the counterparty is prohibited from
terminating or amending the agreement, or claiming an
accelerated payment or forfeiture under the agreement, by
reason only of insolvency or deteriorated financial condition of
the bank, an order creating a bridge bank, specified monetary
and non-monetary defaults, or the assignment or assumption
of the agreement to or by a bridge institution.212 The CDICA
specifies that any stipulation in an agreement is of no force or
effect if it has the effect of not allowing the bridge bank to have
the rights to use or deal with assets that it would otherwise have
on the insolvency of the bank.213
210 Sections 39.15(7), (7.01), (7.1), ibid. Nothing prohibits a person from
requiring payments to be made in cash for goods, services, use of
leased or licensed property or other valuable consideration provided
after the making of the order; or as requiring the advance to a federal
member institution in respect of which an order is made under s
39.13(1) of money or credit after the making of the order; or requiring
the provision to a federal member institution specified services, such as
cash management, services related to the redemption of debt instruments or issuance of letters of credit or guarantees, funds transfer
services, electronic funds transfer at point of sale services, etc, where to
do so would be likely, in the reasonable opinion of the person
providing the service, to result in that person advancing money or
credit to the federal member institution after the making of the order
or to give rise, after the making of the order, to a claim of that person
against the federal member institution.
211 Section 39.151, ibid. The bridge institution may waive the stay.
212 Section 39.152, ibid. Eligible financial contracts as defined in
subsection 39.15(9).
213 Section 39.15(2), ibid.
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Unlike insolvency legislation, eligible financial contracts
(“EFC”) are temporarily stayed. Pre-global financial crisis, an
identified inadequacy in resolution was EFC. That is because
the initiation of a resolution process could trigger the
simultaneous closing out of large volumes of derivative
contracts.214 The exercise of such contractual rights, often
under the ISDA Master Agreements, could destabilize the
financial markets and undermine the orderly resolution of
financial institutions. A solution is to authorize resolution
authorities to temporarily stay the operation of early
termination clauses in order to complete transfer of
derivatives to a bridge institution or another solvent entity.215
Canada has adopted such a stay, but only on an extremely
limited basis.
A counterparty of an EFC cannot terminate, amend,
accelerate or forfeit a term under the contract by reason only
of the bank’s insolvency or deteriorated financial condition,
during the period beginning when an order is made appointing
the CDIC as receiver of the distressed bank or an order is made
directing incorporation of a bridge bank, and ending on the
following business day at 5:00 pm.216 Any stipulation in an
EFC is of no force if it has the effect of providing for or
permitting anything that is contrary to provisions of CDICA,
with the exception that it does not apply in respect of an EFC
between the bank and a clearing house.
The stay does not prevent a member of the Canadian
Payments Association from ceasing to act as a clearing agent
for a federal member institution in accordance with the
Payment Clearing and Settlement Act217 and the Canadian
214 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (“BCBS”), “Report and
recommendations of the Cross-border Bank Resolution Group”
(March 2010), online: BIS 5http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs169.htm4
at 40-41.
215 Ibid.
216 Sections 39.15(7), (7.01), (7.1), CDICA, supra note 2.
217 Payment Clearing and Settlement Act, SC 1996, c 6; ss 39.15(3.2),
(3.3), ibid.
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Payments Act.218 However, where CDIC gives an undertaking
to provide the financial assistance that the institution needs in
order to discharge its obligations to the clearing house as they
become due, the clearing house is to continue to act in that
capacity for the bank.219 If an EFC is assigned to or assumed by
a bridge bank or a third party, CDIC must assign all of the
bank’s obligations arising from the EFC, and the bridge bank
or third party must assume those obligations. The failed bank’s
interest or right in property that secures its obligations under
the EFC is transferred to that bridge institution or the third
party.220
While the stay for EFC is a very short period, it is better than
the lack of any stay of EFC under the Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Act (BIA)221 and the CCAA. It allows CDIC a
very brief period to determine which EFC it will adopt, where
the bank “is in the money”, which EFC to assign to a bridge
bank or third party, and which to terminate. In the
Confederation liquidation in 1994, the liquidator obtained
court approval of a one week stay on EFC, which allowed it to
collect $400 million in value from counterparties.222 Arguably,
the next day stay in the CDICA is not sufficient, and Parliament
should consider a longer stay of one to two weeks to allow
meaningful decision making.
The bridge bank provisions appear to be well suited for small
and medium sized banks, as they allow rapid action to preserve
banking services and address the financial distress. Their
218 Canadian Payments Act, RSC 1985, c C-21; s 39.15(3), CDICA,
supra note 2.
219 Section 39.15(3.3), CDICA, ibid.
220 Sections 39.15(7), (7.2), (7.3), ibid. There are extensive and detailed
provisions outlining the rights and remedies in assigning EFC.
221 BIA, supra note 176.
222 The Attorney General of Canada and Confederation Life Insurance
Company, Court File RE 4315/94, Order of Justice Houlden, Ontario
Court of Justice (Gen Div) 15 August 1994 at para 22(d). In the Matter
of Confederation Life Insurance Company, Court File RE 4315/94, Order
of Justice Houlden, Ontario Court of Justice (Gen Div) 15 August 1994.
Interview, 21 August 2017, liquidator KPMG, on file with author.

Annual Review of Insolvency Law / 307

effectiveness as a tool for D-SIB is less clear, in that their
structures may be too complex for rapid resolution. However,
the statutory framework recognizes that credit must keep
flowing in the economy, and the bridge bank tool is an
important mechanism for helping that to happen.
iv. Exit from bridge bank resolution
There are three avenues to exit from the bridge bank
resolution provisions. One is a share recapitalization, whereby
shares of the bridge bank are sold to a third-party purchaser
that injects additional capital, subject to ministerial approval
and ownership concentration issues being addressed. 223
Another is purchase and assumption, where the assets and
liabilities of the bridge bank are transferred to or assumed by
one or more purchasers. 224 There also could be an
amalgamation of the bridge bank with another financial
institution, subject to ministerial approval and provided
ownership concentration issues are addressed.225
CDIC may hold shares in a bridge bank only if it is the sole
shareholder.226 The bridge bank’s designation as a bridge
institution terminates if the bank is amalgamated with another
financial institution, CDIC is no longer sole shareholder, or
when all or substantially all of the bridge bank’s assets have
been sold or disposed of, and all or substantially all of its
liabilities have been assumed or discharged.227 Once the
transfers of assets and liabilities of the distressed bank to a
bridge bank are substantially completed, CDIC must apply for
a winding-up order under the WURA in respect of the
financially distressed bank. CDIC is deemed to be a creditor
for purposes of WURA.228 CDIC may hold any of the bank’s
223
224
225
226
227
228

CDIC, Bridge Bank Resolution, supra note 187.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Section 39.3714, CDICA, supra note 2.
Sections 39.3715, 39.3716, ibid.
Section 39.3717, ibid. The exception is where OSFI has taken control of
the distressed bank or its assets and has applied for a winding-up order.
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shares that it acquires in the course of a sale or other disposition
of its shares of the bridge bank or that a bridge bank acquires in
the course of a sale or disposition of its assets for a period of no
more than five years from the day on which they are
acquired.229
v. Financial assistance — “Bail-in”
Bail-in is an important tool for resolution of financially
distressed D-SIB. The FSB observes that bail-in, as a
resolution tool, is the authority to convert some of a failed
bank’s debt into equity to recapitalize the bank and help
restore it to viability, without the use of government bailout
funds. 230 Effective 2016, the Canadian Government
introduced bail-in to Canada’s bank resolution toolkit,
following developments internationally.231 The conversion
of preferred shares and subordinated debt into common shares
had already been addressed by OSFI through its capital
guidance a couple of years previously. Under that guidance,
conversion features for preferred shares and subordinated
debt are set in contractual form in the legal documents
governing the instruments at time of issuance. That way,
Sections 39.203(1) and (2), ibid. If there is a liquidator of the
distressed bank appointed under the WURA, supra note 35, it is
bound by the terms and conditions of any transaction that involves
sale or disposition of assets or the assumption by a bridge institution
of any portion of the institution’s liabilities and it must carry out
those transactions or cause them to be carried out, with all related
costs payable by the bridge institution.
229 Section 39.3718, ibid. The Minister may, by order, extend the period
if general market conditions so warrant.
Section 39.372, ibid. The bridge bank does not become liable as a
successor employer of the financially distressed bank’s employees,
but that does not affect the liability of a successor employer other
than the bridge bank.
Section 39.3719, ibid. CDIC employees do not receive any remuneration or benefits from a bridge bank for being a director or officer of
that institution.
230 FSB, Key Attributes, supra note 7.
231 Legislation relating to Canada’s bail-in regime received Royal
Assent in June 2016.
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investors have certainty as to how they will be treated in the
event a bank encounters distress, which facilitates the debt to
equity conversion on a timely basis and reduces some of the risk
of legal challenge over conversion ratios and other terms and
conditions.
The new bail-in regime allows authorities to convert
preferred shares and liabilities of a failing D-SIB into
common shares to recapitalize the bank.232 This conversion is
aimed at restoring the bank to viability by reducing the
liabilities of the bank and increasing the bank’s common equity.
Recapitalizing the bank in this way can allow the bank to
continue operating, and provide assurance to the market,
customers, credit rating agencies, and regulators that the bank
will be able to remain viable. Arguably, government guarantees
will be required to support the recapitalized institution until it
can demonstrate that it has corrected the underlying business
issues that caused problems in the first place. CDIC can
undertake any other restructuring measures necessary to
restore the bank to viability, as discussed previously.233 After
completion of the bail-in conversion and restructuring
measures, CDIC returns the bank to private control.234
The objective of bail-in is to preserve financial stability by
authorizing CDIC to quickly restore a failed systemically
important bank to viability, allowing it to remain open and
232 Department of Finance, Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement,
supra note 20; CDIC Annual Report 2017, supra note 22: MD&A;
once established, further work and consultations will be undertaken
with respect to the operational aspects of executing a bail-in
conversion. CDIC will also develop by-laws to set out procedural
elements, as necessary.
233 The Taxpayer Protection and Bank Recapitalization Program
would allow for the permanent conversion of eligible liabilities of
a non-viable D-SIB into common shares. It would allow a failing
bank to be restructured so that it can keep operating and maintain
its critical services, without taxpayer bail-outs: CDIC Annual
Report 2017, supra note 22 at 77. See also Department of Finance,
Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, supra note 19.
234 Department of Finance, Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, ibid.
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operating, even where the bank has experienced severe
losses.235 It is aimed at reducing the likelihood of failure of a
D-SIB, and reduces government and taxpayer exposure on
such a failure. Another objective is to increase market discipline
by alerting shareholders and creditors to the fact that they bear
the risks of bank failure. CDIC can stabilize a large bank in
financial difficulty and ensure losses are to banks’ shareholders
and creditors in the event of failure, rather than depositors and
taxpayers.236 It does not affect the deposit protection offered by
CDIC.
Following resolution, CDIC has authority to offer
compensation to prescribed creditors and shareholders if
they have been made worse off as a result of CDIC’s actions.
Compensating them for the liquidation value of their claims
mirrors a fundamental principle in insolvency restructuring
that creditors should receive at least what they would receive in
bankruptcy liquidation.
Implementation of the bail-in regime is expected to result
in higher funding costs for D-SIB by reducing the implicit
subsidy associated with bank creditors’ expectation that they
will not suffer losses in the event of a failure. Creditors can no
longer expect taxpayers to bear losses instead of them. Banks
may be required to pay higher interest rates on long-term
senior debt eligible for bail-in, relative to the interest rates
paid on existing equivalent senior debt securities. 237
The federal government has proposed three regulations that
will undergird the bail-in tool.238 The bail-in recapitalization
conversion regulations and the bail-in issuance regulations
235
236
237
238

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Legislation introducing the Bank Recapitalization (Bail-in) Regime
received Royal Assent on 22 June 2016. The regulations prepublished in June 2017, ibid, are important to implementing the
bail-in regime: proposed “Bank Recapitalization (Bail-in) Conversion Regulations”; proposed “Bank Recapitalization (Bail-in)
Issuance Regulations”, proposed “Compensation Regulations”.
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apply only to systemically important banks; and the
compensation regulations apply to all CDIC member
institutions.239 The proposed regulations were published in
June 2017 and are expected to be promulgated late 2017.240
vi. Bank Recapitalization (Bail-in) Conversion Regulations
The proposed “Bank Recapitalization (Bail-in) Conversion
Regulations”, pursuant to the CDICA, set out the scope and
terms of bail-in recapitalization.241 CDIC must take into
consideration Bank Act requirements that banks maintain
adequate capital and ensure that creditor hierarchy is
respected. Regarding order of conversion, bail-in eligible
instruments can only be converted after all subordinate
ranking bail-in eligible instruments and non-viability
contingent capital (“NVCC”) preferred shares have been
converted.242 Holders of equally ranking instruments should
be treated equally; equally ranking bail-in eligible instruments
must be converted in the same proportion, pro rata, and receive
the same number of common shares per dollar of the claim that
is converted.243 Finally, in recognizing the relative creditor
hierarchy, holders of bail-in eligible instruments must receive
more common shares per dollar of the claim that is converted
than holders of subordinate ranking bail-in eligible
instruments and NVCC that have been converted.244 The
239 Ibid.
240 Ibid. The proposed “Bail-in Scope and Conversion Regulations” and
“Bail-in Issuance Regulations” would come into force 180 days after
the day on which they are registered. The proposed “Compensation
Regulations” would come into force on the day that is the later of the
day on which they are registered or the day on which the
amendments to the CDICA, supra note 2, come into force.
241 Ibid.
242 Ibid.
243 Ibid.
244 Ibid. Through existing powers, the GIC and CDIC would also be able
to ensure that senior bail-in debt holders are better off than holders
of legacy capital instruments, ie, the ones that are not NVCC and
that would not be eligible for conversion under the bail-in power. For
example, resolution actions could result in holders of legacy capital
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bail-in power is not retroactive, and thus the conversion
regulations will only apply to instruments that were issued, or
amended to increase their principal value or extend their term,
after the Regulations come into force.
The bail-in conversion is the first avenue to recapitalize the
financially distressed bank. The preferred shares are the first to
be subordinated by conversion into common shares, but it is the
conversion of subordinated debt next that is the more effective
tool to recapitalize, as there will no longer be that debt owed by
the bank. Once the conversion procedure starts to access more
senior debt, there could be litigation challenging the conversion
tool. The terms of conversion are not yet clear; nor is the
relationship between terms of conversion in contractual
arrangements going forward and the conversion regulation.
vii. Bank Recapitalization Issuance Regulations
The Bank Act authorizes the GIC to make regulations
respecting the conditions that systemically important banks
must meet in issuing or amending bail-in eligible shares and
liabilities. The proposed “Bank Recapitalization (Bail-in)
Issuance Regulations”, pursuant to the Bank Act, set out
requirements that D-SIB must follow when issuing bail-in
eligible securities.245 The proposed Regulations are aimed at
allowing CDIC’s bail-in conversion powers to be exercised and
enforceable with respect to all bail-in eligible shares and liabilities,
even where these shares and liabilities are governed by foreign
law. They allow investors to have greater clarity as to which bank
issuances are eligible for CDIC’s bail-in conversion powers.246 To
facilitate enforceability of the bail-in power, particularly in a
cross-border context, the proposed Regulations require that
instruments incurring losses where those instruments are vested in
CDIC by the GIC, pursuant to s 39.13(1)(a), CDICA, supra note 2.
245 Section 39.2(2.4), CDICA, ibid, specifies that the terms, conditions
and timing of a bail-in conversion shall be set by CDIC, subject to
any regulations and CDIC by-laws.
246 Department of Finance, Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement,
supra note 19.
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shares and liabilities within the scope of bail-in indicate in their
contractual terms that the holder of the instrument is bound by
the application of the CDICA, including the conversion of the
instrument into common shares under the bail-in power.247 The
proposed Regulations require that these new contractual terms
be governed by Canadian law, even where the rest of the contract
is governed by foreign law, and will require disclosure to investors
that an instrument is eligible for a bail-in conversion in the
prospectus or other relevant offering or disclosure document.248
All newly issued instruments that are long-term (400 or more
days), unsecured senior debt that is tradable and transferable
would be eligible for a bail-in conversion.249 Newly issued
preferred shares and subordinated debt are also eligible for bailin if they are not NVCC preferred shares. 250 NVCC
instruments are not included in the scope of bail-in, given
that they are already convertible into common shares pursuant
to their contractual terms. Secured liabilities such as covered
bonds, EFC such as derivatives, or structured notes are not
eligible for conversion under bail-in.251 A key point of
uncertainty is the conversion ratio for senior debt into
common shares. While it needs to be at least as generous as
the ratio used for subordinated debt and preferred shares, how
much more generous? That legal uncertainty may hinder the
ability to deploy this tool on a timely basis without excessive
litigation risk. There is also a question of what will happen to
247 Ibid.
248 Ibid. Failure to meet these requirements for a given issuance would
not exempt that issuance from being eligible for bail-in.
249 Ibid. An instrument is considered tradable and transferable if it has
a Committee on Uniform Securities Identification Procedures
(“CUSIP”) number, International Securities Identification Number
(“ISIN”) or other similar identification.
250 Ibid. The briefing note says: “However, in practice, banks are not
expected to issue any such instruments, as preferred shares and
subordinated debt are almost exclusively issued in the form of
NVCC in order to have them count towards existing regulatory
capital requirements set by OSFI.”
251 Proposed “Bail-in Issuance Regulation”, supra note 238, pursuant
to the Bank Act, supra note 2.
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the funding markets for banks after it has been deployed. It may
cause banks to destabilize sooner if markets become jittery
faster, which could reduce the effectiveness of the remedy for
other banks.
The goal is to minimize the practical and legal impediments
to exercising a bail-in conversion in a timely fashion and to
minimize potential adverse impacts on banks’ access to
liquidity under stress.
viii. Compensation Regulations
The proposed Compensation Regulations, pursuant to
CDICA, set out a process for providing creditors and
shareholders of financial institutions with compensation from
CDIC following a resolution process. The compensation
process involves a test of whether the resolution transaction
undertaken by CDIC was reasonable in the circumstances.252
The June 2017 legislative amendments revised the
compensation process by setting out a test for entitlement to
compensation consistent with international standards and best
practices, and moving most elements of the process into
regulations and CDIC by-laws.253 The goal is to provide
greater flexibility as experience is gained with the new resolution
regime.
The new compensation test is whether the relevant
shareholders and creditors have been made worse off as a
result of CDIC’s actions than they would have been if the bank
had been liquidated.254 “Prescribed persons” entitled to
compensation are persons who hold the following claims in
the bank at the time of entry into resolution: shares of the
institution; subordinated debt instruments that were vested in
252 Sections 39.23 to 39.37, CDICA, supra note 2. CDICA sets out
detailed procedural requirements.
253 Department of Finance, Regulations to Implement Bank Recapitalization, supra note 27.
254 Adapting or repealing and replacing ss 39.23 to 39.37, CDICA,
supra note 2. These amendments would be brought into force
concurrently with the proposed Regulations.
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CDIC; liabilities that were subsequently converted into
common shares pursuant to their contractual terms and
conditions, such as NVCC; liabilities that were subsequently
converted into common shares pursuant to the bail-in power;
any liability of the bank if it was wound up at the end of the
resolution process; and any liability of the bank that was
assumed by either a CDIC-owned workout company or bridge
bank that was subsequently liquidated or wound up.255
Individuals who hold liabilities of the bank at the time of
entry into resolution that were subsequently assumed by a
solvent third party or a bridge bank are not entitled to
compensation because they continue to have a claim of the
same value and type against a solvent going-concern entity, for
example, the bank restored to viability, a third party or a bridge
institution.256 If amounts owing are subsequently paid off in
full during the resolution process, there is no need for, and thus
no right to compensation.
The right to compensation is a personal right, not
transferable. This limitation is intended to reduce the
potential role of speculators in the compensation process,
support administrative simplicity of the process, and ensure
greater alignment between individuals entitled to
compensation and the creditors and shareholders affected by
CDIC’s resolution actions.
Compensation will be based on the difference between an
estimate of what prescribed persons would have received if the
institution had been wound up, ie, the liquidation value, and an
estimate of the resolution value, ie, what they receive through
the resolution process.257 In practice, it may be difficult to
calculate this value; it is thus far untested.
255 Department of Finance, Regulations to Implement Bank Recapitalization, supra note 27.
256 Ibid.
257 Ibid. If there is no difference, there is no entitlement to compensation.
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Fairness underpins the compensation scheme. CDIC must
make the same offer of compensation to prescribed persons
who held shares or liabilities of the same class in proportion to
their claim. Shares or liabilities are deemed to be in the same
class if they would rank equally in the event of a winding-up
and received equivalent treatment in the resolution. The
proposed Regulations set out certain assumptions that CDIC
must take into account when determining the offer of
compensation.258 Since resolution, as with restructuring
plans under regular insolvency law, is aimed at preserving
more than the liquidation value of a bank, the government
believes that the amount of compensation owing is likely to be
little or none in most cases.259
Notice is to be given within a reasonable period of time
following the completion of the resolution process.
“Reasonableness” is likely to vary with the size and
complexity of the resolution process. The offerees will have
45 days to notify CDIC of their acceptance of, or objection to,
the offer received; and failure to notify CDIC will be deemed
acceptance of the offer.260 This “scream or die” approach
assists with expediting the process, as failure to respond counts
as approval. CDIC is to pay the entitled compensation to the
creditors and/or shareholders within 90 days of expiry of
CDIC’s offer of compensation, if the offer was accepted, or the
final determination of an assessor, where used.261
The proposed regulations specify the conditions under which
the GIC is required to appoint a judge as an assessor to review
CDIC’s determination of compensation for prescribed
258 Ibid. For example, in estimating the liquidation value of shares or
liabilities, CDIC would be required to assume that in the counterfactual scenario of the bank being liquidated, the bank would not
have received any financial assistance or support from CDIC, the
Bank of Canada, the Government of Canada or a province in the
process.
259 Ibid.
260 Ibid.
261 Ibid.
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persons.262 The threshold for requiring an assessor to be
appointed is persons who held 10% of the value of debt or 10%
of the shares of a given class objecting to CDIC’s offer. Those
objecting persons would be entitled to have their compensation
determined by the assessor.263 Those persons who accepted
CDIC’s offer would receive the amount set out in the offer.264 In
reviewing CDIC’s offer of compensation, the assessor will
consider whether CDIC’s offer was reasonable and consider the
same factors CDIC was required to apply when making its
initial determination of compensation. Pursuant to CDICA,
the assessor’s decision regarding compensation owed is final
and conclusive.
The three proposed regulations offer more detail regarding
how the bail-in recapitalization tool is to work and what the
permissible compensation will be for its use. One area that is
likely to be litigated is how one determines the “no less than
liquidation value” in the conversion of debt to equity. While
creditors will be alerted to the possibility of conversion in
contracts going forward, the amount of compensation to which
the debt is entitled on conversion could be highly contested.
3. Liquidation of a Bank
Bank exit is an important feature of the bank resolution
regime. The previously-discussed recent developments build on
existing provisions under the Bank Act and the WURA for
wind-up of banks. While the goal of the new regime is to resolve
without winding-up, where possible, a brief description of the
liquidation regime completes the picture of the structural
supports in the bank resolution regime in Canada. Depending
on whether a bank is solvent or insolvent, different statutory
frameworks must be accessed.
262 Section 39.26, CDICA, supra note 2, requires the appointed thirdparty assessor to be a federal judge. Ibid.
263 Department of Finance, Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement,
ibid.
264 Ibid.
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i. Liquidation pursuant to the Bank Act
The Bank Act’s liquidation and dissolution provisions allow
for voluntary liquidation and court-supervised liquidation of
solvent banks, which can include at-risk banks that are not yet
insolvent. A liquidator is appointed to wind-up the business.265
A “simple liquidation” procedure is available where the bank
has no property and no liabilities.266 Directors or shareholders
of a bank may propose a voluntary liquidation and
dissolution.267 Shareholders of a bank can vote by special
resolution for liquidation, requiring votes by class where there
are different classes of shares.268 Ministerial approval of the
liquidation is required, after which there is a process for giving
notice to known claimants and creditors, as well as public
notice.269 Following ministerial approval, the bank can
proceed to collect and dispose of property; liquidate the
business; adequately provide for the payment or discharge of all
its obligations; and distribute its remaining property, either in
money or in kind, according to shareholders’ respective
rights.270 The bank cannot carry on business except to the
extent necessary to complete liquidation. 271 Where the
voluntary process is not contested before a court, and once
the Minister is satisfied that the provisions of the Bank Act have
been complied with, the Minister will issue letters patent to
265 Section 341, Bank Act, supra note 2:
341 A liquidator appointed under this Part to wind up the business of a
bank shall provide the Superintendent with such information relating to
the business and affairs of the bank in such form as the Superintendent
requires.

266 Section 342, Bank Act, ibid.
267 Section 343, Bank Act, ibid. “Bank” here includes federal credit
union.
343(2). A notice of any meeting at which the voluntary liquidation and
dissolution of a bank is to be proposed must set out the terms of the
proposal.

268 Section 344, Bank Act, ibid, as well as members and shareholders of
a credit union for a credit union liquidation.
269 Section 345, Bank Act, ibid.
270 Section 345(4), Bank Act, ibid.
271 Section 345(3), Bank Act, ibid.
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declare the bank dissolved, at which time the bank ceases to
exist.272 The Bank Act’s liquidation and dissolution provisions
are stayed if the bank is at any time found to be insolvent within
the meaning of the WURA.273
Under the court-supervised liquidation process, OSFI or
any interested person may, at any time during the liquidation
of a bank, apply to a court for an order for continuance of the
voluntary liquidation under supervision of the court, stating
the reasons why court supervision is needed. 274 The court
must be satisfied that the bank is able to adequately provide
for the discharge of all its obligations. Pursuant to the Bank
Act, the court can order notice, order liquidation, appoint a
liquidator, with or without security, validate claims, impose a
stay on activities of directors and officers, determine duties or
liabilities of any present or former director, officer, or
shareholder, distribute property, or make any order it thinks
fit.275
When a liquidation order is made, the bank continues in
existence but must cease carrying on business, except as the
liquidator decides is required for an orderly liquidation. 276 The
powers of the directors and shareholders are vested in the
liquidator, except as specifically authorized by the court. 277
The liquidator’s duties are extensive, and include giving broad
notice,278 receiving claims, taking custody and control of the
272 Section 346, Bank Act, ibid.
273 Section 340(2), Bank Act, ibid; WURA, supra note 35.
274 Section 347, Bank Act, ibid. Verified by an affidavit of the applicant.
Section 347(3), Bank Act, ibid. The applicant must give notice to the
Superintendent, who has a right to be heard.
275 Sections 348, 349, Bank Act, ibid.
276 Section 350, Bank Act, ibid.
Section 351, Bank Act, ibid. The Court can appoint any person,
including a director, an officer, a shareholder or a member of the
bank or any other bank, as liquidator of the bank.
277 Section 350, Bank Act, ibid.
278 Section 353(1)(b), Bank Act, ibid. Notice to every claimant, creditor
and the Superintendent, publishing notice in all jurisdictions where
the bank has transacted any business within the preceding 12
months.
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bank’s property, collecting assets, opening and maintaining
trust accounts, keeping accounts, and reporting periodically to
the Superintendent and the court.279 Claims must be made
within 60 days after first publication of the notice.280 If, at any
time, the liquidator determines that the bank is unable to
discharge its obligations, it must apply to the court for
directions.281 Subject to the rights of secured creditors, the
Bank Act sets out a hierarchy of priority claims.
The powers accorded the liquidator under the statute are
broad, including bringing or defending any action on behalf of
the bank, hiring financial and legal expertise, and borrowing
money on the security of the property of the bank.282 After the
final accounts are approved by the court, the liquidator
distributes any remaining property among shareholders
according to their respective rights.283 The court approves
distributions of remaining property, final accounts, and giving
a final order directing the bank to apply to the Minister for
letters patent dissolving the bank, directing the custody or
disposal of records and registers of the bank, and discharging
the liquidator.284
279
280
281
282

Section
Section
Section
Section

353, Bank Act, ibid.
353(1)(b)(iii), Bank Act, ibid.
353(1)(g), Bank Act, ibid.
353, Bank Act, ibid.

355(1) Where a liquidator has reason to believe that any property of the
bank is in the possession or under the control of a person or that a person
has concealed, withheld or misappropriated any such property, the
liquidator may apply to the court for an order requiring that person to
appear before the court at the time and place designated in the order and
to be examined.
355(2) Where an examination conducted pursuant to subsection (1)
discloses that a person has concealed, withheld or misappropriated any
property of the bank, the court may order that person to restore the
property or pay compensation to the liquidator.
356 A liquidator shall pay the costs of liquidation out of the property of
the bank and shall pay or make adequate provision for all claims against
the bank.

283 Section 353(1)(i), Bank Act, ibid.
284 Sections 357, 358, Bank Act, ibid.
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The Bank Act sets out rights to distribution or to exchange of
all or substantially all of the remaining property of the bank for
securities of another entity that are to be distributed to the
shareholders.285 If one of these parties requests the distribution
in money, the court must fix a fair value on the share of the
property of the bank attributable to the person, and can
appoint one or more appraisers to assist the court.286 Similar to
voluntary liquidation, the Minister, on receipt of a court order,
may issue letters patent dissolving the bank, and the bank
ceases to exist on the date of the issuance of the letters patent.287
The liability standard for the liquidator is similar to other
insolvency statutes. A liquidator is not liable if it exercised the
care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would
have exercised in comparable circumstances, including reliance
in good faith on financial statements of the bank represented to
the liquidator by bank officers or auditor reports of the bank
fairly reflecting the financial condition of the bank; or a report
of a person whose profession lends credibility to a statement
made by them.288
ii. Bank liquidation under the Winding-up and Restructuring
Act
If a bank is insolvent, liquidation proceedings are brought
pursuant to WURA. A company is deemed insolvent under
WURA if it is unable to pay its debts as they become due; 289 if
it calls a meeting of its creditors for the purpose of
285
286
287
288
289

Section 353, Bank Act, ibid.
Section 353, Bank Act, ibid.
Section 360, Bank Act, ibid.
Section 354, Bank Act, ibid.
Sections 3, 4, WURA, supra note 35:
4 A company is deemed to be unable to pay its debts as they become due
whenever a creditor, to whom the company is indebted in a sum exceeding
two hundred dollars then due, has served on the company, in the manner
in which process may legally be served on it in the place where service is
made, a demand in writing, requiring the company to pay the sum due,
and the company has, for sixty days next after the service of the demand,
neglected to pay the sum or to secure or compound for the sum to the
satisfaction of the creditor.
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compounding with them; if it exhibits a statement showing its
inability to meet its liabilities; or if it has otherwise
acknowledged its insolvency. 290 It is also deemed insolvent
if it assigns, removes or disposes of any of its property with
intent to defraud, defeat or delay its creditors, or attempts to
do so; or if it has procured money, goods, chattels, land or
property to be seized, levied on or taken, by any process of
execution with intent to defraud, defeat or delay its creditors.
It is also deemed insolvent if it has made any general
conveyance or assignment of its property for the benefit of
its creditors; or if it is unable to meet its liabilities in full, it
makes any sale or conveyance of the whole or the main part of
its stock in trade or assets without the consent of its creditors
or without satisfying their claims. 291 The winding-up is
deemed to commence at the time of the service of the notice of
presentation of the petition for winding-up. 292
A court may make a winding-up order in respect of a bank or
foreign authorized bank where the bank is insolvent or where
OSFI has taken control of a bank or its assets pursuant to the
Bank Act.293 The directors, officers and employees are required
to make disclosures that allow “a just estimate of the affairs” of
the bank.294 From the time of the winding-up order, the bank is
to cease carrying on its business, except in so far as the
290 Section 3, WURA, ibid.
291 Section 3, WURA, ibid. It is also deemed insolvent if it meets one of
a long list of conditions under s 3.
292 Section 5, WURA, ibid.
293 Sections 10, 10.1, WURA, ibid.
Section 6, WURA, ibid. The Act applies where a corporation is in
liquidation or winding-up and, on petition by any of its shareholders/members or creditors, assignees or liquidators, asks to be
brought under this Act; or if it is a financial institution, is under the
control, or its assets are under the control, of the Superintendent
and is the subject of an application for a winding-up order. Part II
Authorized Foreign Banks applies only to the winding-up of the
business in Canada of authorized foreign banks and to the
liquidation of their assets. Part III of WURA addresses the
restructuring of insurance companies.
294 Section 15, WURA, ibid.
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liquidator deems necessary for the beneficial winding-up.295
The effect of a winding-up order is that no suit, action or other
proceeding can be commenced or continued against the bank,
except with leave of the court. All transfers of shares are void,
except transfers made with approval of the liquidator under the
authority of the court.296 Any attachment or execution against
the order is void, but there is a carve out for EFC.297
The liquidator is either the CDIC or a licensed insolvency
trustee under the BIA.298 OSFI and CDIC confer on who the
liquidator should be, and CDIC enters into nomination
agreements with the liquidator, setting terms of engagement,
including frequency of reporting, billing rates and other
expectations. On appointment of a liquidator, all powers of
the directors cease, except in so far as the court or the
liquidator approves continuance of those powers. 299 A
liquidator takes custody and control of all property, effects
and choses, and winds-up the business.300 It can also, on
notice and with approval of the court, bring or defend any
action or other legal proceeding; sell or transfer the real and
personal property, effects and choses in action of the company
by public auction or private contract; and act in the name and
on behalf of the company on a number of financial matters. 301
295 Section 19, WURA, ibid.
296 Sections 20, 21, WURA, ibid. See also ss 17, 18, ibid: The WURA
allows the court to make an order staying further proceedings in any
action, suit or proceeding against the company, on such terms as the
court thinks fit, or staying proceedings in respect of the winding-up.
297 Sections 22, 22.1, WURA, ibid.
298 Sections 23, 25, 26, WURA, ibid.
27 The court shall determine what security shall be given by a liquidator
on [its] appointment.

299 Section 31, WURA, ibid.
300 Section 33, WURA, ibid.
301 Section 35, WURA, ibid. See also:
37 A liquidator may, with the approval of the court, compromise all calls
and liabilities to calls, debts and liabilities capable of resulting in debts,
and all claims, demands and matters in dispute in any way relating to or
affecting the assets of the company or the winding-up of the company, on
the receipt of such sums, payable at such times, and generally on such
terms, as are agreed on.

324 / Resolving Bank Financial Distress in Canada

A liquidator may, with approval of the court, make any
compromise or arrangements that it considers appropriate
with creditors. 302 A court may appoint one or more
inspectors, whose duty it is to assist and advise a liquidator
in the liquidation of a company.303
There are provisions for identifying contributories who may
be liable to contribute assets.304 A court may, if it thinks
expedient, direct meetings of the creditors, contributories,
shareholders or members of a company for the purpose of
ascertaining their wishes.305 In particular, the court can order a
creditors’ meeting where any compromise or arrangement is
proposed in the course of the bank being wound-up.306 If a
majority in number representing three-fourths in value of the
creditors or classes of creditors, present or by proxy, agree to
any arrangement or compromise, it may be sanctioned by the
court, and is binding on all the creditors, the liquidator and
contributories of the company.307 Clerks and other employees
have a limited priority of three months of salary due and unpaid
to them at the time of the making of a winding-up order.308 Setoff applies.309 The court can fix a date for claims to be filed; the
liquidator sends a notice to creditors and can ask claimants to
furnish more proof. Creditors can request to have disputed
claims determined by the court.310 After notice and the claims
process, the liquidator may distribute the assets of the bank
among persons entitled to them.311
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311

Section 38, WURA, ibid.
Section 41, WURA, ibid.
Sections 50 to 62, WURA, ibid.
Section 63, WURA, ibid.
Section 65, WURA, ibid.
Section 66, WURA, ibid.
Section 72, WURA, ibid.
Section 73(1), WURA, ibid.
Sections 74, 75(1) to (3), WURA, ibid.
Sections 76, 77, WURA, ibid. See also s 71(1): All debts and other
claims against the bank in existence at the commencement of the
winding-up, certain or contingent, matured or not, and liquidated
or unliquidated, are admissible to proof against the bank, and the
amount of any claim admissible to proof is the unpaid debt or other
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Secured creditors must specify the nature and amount of
their security, and, on oath, put a specified value on the
security.312 The liquidator, under the authority of the court,
may either consent to the retention by the creditor at the value
specified in the security documents, or may require from the
creditor or person an assignment and delivery of the security,
property and effects at the specified value, to be paid by the
liquidator out of the estate as soon as the liquidator has realized
the security.313 If the secured creditor retains the asset, the
difference between the value at which the security is retained
and the amount of the claim is the amount for which the creditor
may rank in any future distribution of assets.314 The WURA
also has provisions for where a person holds security on the
assets of an authorized foreign bank, other than assets in
respect of its business in Canada.315 The liquidator, in
preparing the dividend sheet, must have due regard for the
rank and privilege of every creditor, and no dividend can be
paid to any secured creditor until the amount for which it may
rank with respect to dividends is established.316
Objections to any claims must be filed in writing with the
liquidator, together with supporting evidence, and the claimant
has six days to answer the objections, or such further time as the
court allows. The contestant (objecting party) has three days to
reply, or such further time as the court allows.317 The court
hears and decides the matter.318

312
313

314
315
316

liability outstanding or accrued at the commencement of the
winding-up.
See also s 71(2), WURA, ibid: If the claim is subject to any
contingency or for unliquidated damages, the court is to determine
the value of the claim and the amount for which it shall rank.
Section 78, WURA, ibid.
Section 79, WURA, ibid: Together with interest on the value from
the date of filing the claim. See also s 78: In the case of an
authorized foreign bank, this duty is one of the creditor or person
who holds security of the property and effects constituting the
security or on which it attaches.
Section 80, WURA, ibid.
Sections 81.1, 82, 83, 84, WURA, ibid.
Section 85, WURA, ibid.
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All costs, charges and expenses properly incurred in the
winding-up of a company, including the remuneration of the
liquidator, are payable out of the assets of the company in
priority to all other claims.319 There are a series of fraudulent
preference provisions, including gratuitous contracts,
contracts made with intent to defraud or delay creditors, and
sales in contemplation of insolvency.320 If a company has paid a
dividend within 12 months prior to commencement of the
winding-up, other than a stock dividend, or redeemed or
purchased for cancellation any of the shares of the capital stock,
the court may, on application of the liquidator, determine if the
payment, redemption or purchase occurred when the company
was insolvent or if it rendered the company insolvent.321
Directors can be held personally liable, jointly and severally,
where the court finds that the transaction occurred when the
company was insolvent or it rendered the company insolvent;
and the directors did not have reasonable grounds to believe the
company was solvent or the transaction would not render the
company insolvent.322 The court is to consider whether the
directors acted as prudent and diligent persons would have
acted in the same circumstances and whether the directors in
317 Sections 87, 88, WURA, ibid.
318 Section 89, WURA, ibid.
319 Section 94, WURA, ibid. Section 95 specifies that after the
satisfaction of the debts and liabilities of the company and the
winding-up charges, costs and expenses, any residual value is
distributed among the shareholders according to their rights and
interests in the company.
320 Sections 96-101, WURA, ibid.
321 Section 102.1, WURA, ibid.
322 Section 102.1(2), WURA, ibid.
140 If it appears in the course of the winding-up that any past or present
director, manager, officer or member of the company is guilty of an
offence in relation to the company for which he [or she] is criminally
liable, the court may, on the application of any person interested in the
winding-up, or of its own motion, direct the liquidator to institute and
conduct a prosecution or prosecutions for the offence and may order the
costs and expenses to be paid out of the assets of the company. WURA,
ibid.
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good faith relied on financial or other statements of the
company represented to them by its officers or auditor.323
All dividends deposited in a bank by the liquidator after the
final winding up of the bank, and remaining unclaimed are to be
left for three years, subject to the claim of the persons entitled;
and then if unclaimed, paid over, with interest accrued, to the
Minister of Industry. If such dividends are afterwards claimed,
they are to be paid, with that interest, to the persons entitled to
them.324
Thus, the liquidation regime for banks offers a clear exit
when a non-viable or insolvent bank cannot be resolved using
other tools in the resolution tool box. It is the last resort action
that offers certainty to creditors on failure of the bank.
4. How Canada Measures against International Developments
As the discussion illustrates, Canada’s bank resolution
regime meets most of the FSB’s key attributes for an effective
resolution regime, including a resolution authority with power
to: replace directors and officers, appoint an administrative
authority, operate and resolve the bank on a going-concern
basis, ensure continuity of essential services, transfer or sell
assets and liabilities, establish a bridge bank, and use bail-in to
more fairly allocate the costs of failure. It does not establish one
resolution authority nationally for all financial institutions. 325
323 Sections 102.1(3), (7), WURA, ibid. The onus is on the directors and
officers to prove the bank was not insolvent or rendered insolvent,
and that there were reasonable grounds for the decision, by written
reports of the auditor to fairly reflect the financial condition of the
company; or a report relating to the company’s affairs prepared
pursuant to a contract with the company by a lawyer, notary, an
accountant, engineer or appraiser or other person whose profession
gave credibility to the statements made in the report.
324 Sections 138, 139, WURA, ibid.
325 FSB, Key Attributes, supra note 7 at 5-6. The FSB recommends that
each jurisdiction should have a designated administrative authority
or authorities responsible for exercising the resolution powers over
firms. It notes, however, that where there are multiple resolution
authorities within a jurisdiction their respective mandates, roles and
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In 2016, the FSB published a study summarizing a series of
peer reviews regarding timely and consistent implementation of
the FSB’s Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for
Financial Institutions.326 It found that six EU jurisdictions and
Switzerland have the full range of resolution powers; and the
US has all the resolution powers except explicit power for the
resolution authority to require continued provision of critical
shared services by group companies. Canada was one of six
jurisdictions to have put in place most of the recommended
powers.327 However, the FSB identified one gap: the lack of
explicit power in Canada to ensure continuity of shared services
and functions by other entities, whether or not regulated,
within the same financial group as the bank in resolution.328 It
also noted the limited resolution power of CDIC, in that it only
covers member institutions, not related entities that are not
member institutions.329
The FSB peer review expressed general concern about
jurisdictional divergence in conditions relating to
deterioration, risk of default and non-viability risks that
could impede coordinated resolution action across

326

327

328
329

responsibilities should be clearly defined and coordinated. The FSB
Key Attributes report also specifies that where different resolution
authorities are in charge of resolving entities of the same group
within a single jurisdiction, the resolution regime of that jurisdiction
should identify a lead authority that coordinates the resolution of
the legal entities within that jurisdiction.
FSB, “Second Thematic Review on Resolution Regimes” (18 March
2016), part of the commitment by FSB member countries to
undergo periodic peer review. FSB 5http://www.fsb.org/2016/03/
second-thematic-review-on-resolution-regimes/4 [“FSB, Second
Thematic Review”].
Ibid. The remaining ten jurisdictions have four or fewer of the
required resolution powers. The powers lacking are continuity
powers, bail-in or a stay on the exercise of early termination rights.
A number of jurisdictions still rely largely on supervisory powers or
sector-specific insolvency law without a designated administrative
resolution authority with a broad range of powers they can exercise
without prior shareholder or creditor approval.
Ibid at 18-19.
Ibid at 26.
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jurisdictions in relation to a cross-border bank.330 While
Canada has signed memoranda of understanding (“MOU”)
with the US and the UK regarding resolution cooperation, the
MOU are non-binding. There continues to be a risk that such
agreements are abandoned in favour of foreign domestic
priorities in times of financial crisis, particularly where views
differ as to who should bear the costs of resolution of a crossborder insolvent bank.331
The FSB report observed that the temporary stay on EFC in
Canada is only available where there is a transfer to a bridge
bank, not under the other resolution tools.332 It also noted that
resolution plans were limited at that time to D-SIB, a mid-sized
bank, one Canadian subsidiary of a G-SIB and one small
domestic bank, but could be ordered by OSFI on a case-by-case
basis.333
Thus, while Canada measures relatively well against the
international standards, there are several gaps in its resolution
framework.
5. Should There be One National Bank Resolution Authority?
A completely under-explored question in the Canadian
public policy landscape is whether or not there should be one
national resolution authority for all financial institutions in
Canada. This article is not suggesting there should be, but
rather, the public policy discussion never occurred and thus it is
unknown. What is evident is that there is a risk of
fragmentation in approaches to resolution where the
distressed bank is part of a conglomerate with banks, broker
dealer entities, investment funds, and other financial services
330 Ibid at 22.
331 The IMF observes that home and host jurisdictions can have
conflicting interests when required to provide liquidity to the crossborder bank; IMF, “Cross-Border Bank Resolution: Recent
Developments” (June 2014), online: IMF 5http://www.imf.org/
external/np/pp/eng/2014/060214.pdf4 at 20.
332 FSB, “Second Thematic Review”, supra note 326 at 28.
333 Ibid at 33.
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entities. There is lack of clarity of leadership in decision and
resolution authority, given the complex processes, and both
federal and provincial oversight and resolution authorities. No
one authority can expeditiously monitor and resolve financial
conglomerates covering several types of financial institutions.
In the resolution regime, there is overlap of authority at
various points in bank distress, including OSFI, CDIC, the
Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada,
provincial securities regulators and provincial financial
services commissions. While it appears from the 2017
amendments to CDICA that CDIC is the lead decision
authority on bank resolution, there remains some lack of
clarity in the law, given the retention by OSFI of take-control
powers. In addition, OSFI’s authority to require a restructuring
is unclear under the current legislation. The current statutory
framework is likely to be tested in the future. While it is likely
that the entity most at risk in the conglomerate will be a bank
and thus the CDIC could take the lead, there are potential
contagion effects both ways between the bank and the other
entities. There could be billions of dollars in underwriting,
bonds or derivatives between the entities, or between the
entities and third-party counterparties, with a lack of clarity of
which entity books what. A serious issue with a broker dealer
entity could contaminate the related bank financially or
reputationally very rapidly. Any cross-contagion may be
exacerbated while authorities figure out how to work
together effectively to resolve the situation. While the current
system is messy, but arguably manageable, it could be
improved, given the importance of our financial institutions
to the economy.
One thing that Parliament could do now is to clarify what
entity is the lead macroprudential authority when there is a
conglomerate that has a deposit-taking bank, a brokerage
entity and/or an investment fund, as the non-viability of one
entity can cause stress or solvency issues in the related entities.
Even though some entities within one business enterprise group
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can be federally regulated and others provincially regulated,
designation of a lead authority on insolvency is unlikely to
cause problems under current paramountcy tests. That
leadership could assess the risk across the bank enterprise
group, and take preventive and early intervention measures as
required, with a full range of resolution powers.
Another issue arises in respect of cross-border bank
resolution. Where the resolution authority is seeking
endorsement of bank resolution in a foreign jurisdiction, it
cannot take advantage of the UNCITRAL Model Law on
Cross-border Insolvency, as financial institutions have been
excluded from those provisions where they have been enacted
into law. A government agency may have better chance of
initial recognition in an outbound proceeding, or in dealing
government to government on the failure of a systemically
important bank that operates in multiple jurisdictions. The
current provisions do not expressly address this issue and it may
not be clarified until the first litigation. On the in-bound side,
where a Canadian court is being asked to recognize a foreign or
cross-border bank resolution plan, there may be an issue as to
who would serve in a role similar to a court-appointed officer,
to provide the court with an informed opinion as to the fairness
and reasonableness of what the court is being asked to approve.
Canada has chosen the deposit insurance corporation as the
resolution authority for banks. When the CDIC was originally
created 50 years ago, Parliamentary debates record that “the
legislation was intended to prevent a run or attempted run on a
federal institution”.334 Three purposes were given for CDIC’s
creation: to protect the public by ensuring the safety of the bank
savings of individuals; to act as a lender of last resort for
member institutions, a role to be shared with the Bank of
Canada; and to provide regular inspections and some control of
334 Canada Hansard, Senate Debates, 27th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 2 (16
February 1967) at 1452-1460 (Hon John J Connolly, Hon Allister
Grosart), online: Parliament of Canada 5http://parl.canadiana.ca/
view/oop.debates_SOC2701_02/439?r=0&s=14. Second reading
of Bill C-261, which established the CDIC.
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the financial affairs of member institutions, with the objective
of bringing about gradual improvement in the minimum
financial standards.335 The creation of CDIC was also intended
to stimulate confidence in deposit-taking institutions.336
When the CDICA was amended in 2016, the focus of the
parliamentary discussion was to make creditors and equity
holders responsible for the bank’s risks, not taxpayers.337 The
government highlighted that the changes were driven by
developments internationally at the G20 and many
international organizations to maintain stability in the
financial sector and address the fact that taxpayers should
not bear the costs of recapitalization.338 The purpose of the
amendments was to designate the CDIC as the bank resolution
authority for its members, the Department of Finance advising
Parliament that it was mostly a formality, since CDIC was
already able to resolve a bank in the case of a failure.339 The
changes were also intended to provide transparency regarding
CDIC’s activities as the resolution authority for its members. 340
335 Ibid.
336 Ibid.
337 Bill C-15, An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in
Parliament on March 22, 2016, and other measures, Hansard 49, 1st
Sess, 42nd Parl, (5 May 2016), online: Parliament of Canada
5https://openparliament.ca/debates/2016/5/5/francesco-sorbara-14.
Presenter: Francesco Sorbara, MP for Vaughan-Woodbridge, ON,
described as: “Bill C-15 introduces a bail-in regime that applies to
Canada’s domestic systemically important banks, overseen by
regulators including the CDIC. Under the new regime, regulators
would be allowed to recapitalize a failing bank by converting eligible
long-term debt into shares.”
338 Ibid.
339 Bill C-44, An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in
Parliament on March 22, 2017, and other measures, Finance Committee
(9 May 2017), online: Parliament of Canada 5https://openparliament.ca/committees/finance/42-1/86/justin-brown-1/4 [“Bill C-44”].
Presenters: Lisa Pezzack (director), and Justin Brown (chief) from
the Department of Finance, Financial Sector Policy Branch.
340 Bill C-15, An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled
in Parliament on March 22, 2016, and other measures, part 4, division
5, the bank recapitalization regime, Finance Committee (10 May
2016), online: Parliament of Canada 5https://openparliament.ca/
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The amendments accounted for additional risk to the economy
posed by systemically important institutions, justifying
additional supervisory and regulatory oversight, including
additional capital buffers, constraints on risk management and
overall supervision. 341 The amendments were aimed at
providing “stability and transparency in the financial sector:
to keep big banks operating, keep their customers protected,
retain deposits and attract new ones” and to “align risk to its
appropriate return and ensure that incentives are aligned for
prudent management by putting creditors and shareholders
ahead of the taxpayer in a recapitalization scenario”.342 The
parliamentary statements align with policy discussions
internationally.
However, there appears to have been no discussion in
Parliament on whether there should be one coordinated or lead
resolution authority. In many developed countries, there is one
national resolution authority, and the EU is moving towards a
pan-European single resolution authority, with a board that
oversees the Single Resolution Fund, which can be used for
banking recovery, resolution and other acts to help stabilize the
financial system. Arguably, Canada should have an informed
public policy discussion on what structure would be most effective
committees/finance/42-1/19/glenn-campbell-10/4. Presenter: Glenn
Campbell (director) from the Department of Finance, Financial
Sector Policy Branch; Bill C-44, ibid.
341 Bill C-15, An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled
in Parliament on March 22, 2016, and other measures, part 4, division
5, the bank recapitalization regime bail-in, Finance Committee (18
May 2016), online: Parliament of Canada 5https://openparliament.ca/committees/finance/42-1/22/glenn-campbell-14/?page=34. Presenter: Glenn Campbell (director) from the Department of Finance,
Financial Sector Policy Branch.
342 Ibid. The debates note that long-term debt security is in regulations
as well as legislation because the industry must be consulted on two
matters: firstly, as to what precisely constitutes a long-term debt
security, the definition of which can shift and may need to be
adjusted over time; and secondly, under which instruments they can
be issued — currently banks issue non-viability contingent capital
under contract law, but the industry is looking for more certainty.
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in resolving financial institution financial distress or insolvency
and best protect depositors, policy holders and creditors.
i. Should the resolution authority be the insurance fund?
Moreover, there is little or no public policy discussion on
whether it is prudent to have the insurance fund as the
resolution authority, or what benefits or conflicts might arise
from that dual role. Here, there is little scholarly literature that
examines the pros and cons of such a conflation under bank
resolution frameworks, notwithstanding that there was public
outcry at the height of the global financial crisis that deposit
insurance funds should not be used to bail-out banks.
It is important that the deposit insurance fund in Canada is
separated from the oversight regulator, as it reduces the
potential risk of having those funds directed away from
protecting depositors. However, with the new resolution
authority given to CDIC, is there a risk of pressure on the
deposit insurance fund if a systemically large bank were to fail?
One way that CDIC is trying to prevent that situation is to build
up capital reserves to deal with resolution, as discussed
previously.
A brief canvas of other jurisdictions reveals mixed views as to
whether the insurance fund should also be the resolution
authority. In the UK, for example, the Financial Services
Compensation Scheme343 is responsible for the deposit
insurance fund; and the Bank of England is the responsible
authority for bank recovery and resolution.344 In the EU more
343 Set up under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK), c 8.
344 Lucy Chennells and Venetia Wingfield, “Bank failure and bail-in: an
an introduction” (2015), online: Bank of England 5http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/2015/
q302.pdf4; “Carrying out a bail-in”, online: Bank of England
5http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Pages/role/risk_reduction/srr/carryingbail.aspx4; HM Treasury, “Consultation
outcome: Bail-in powers implementation” (12 December 2014),
online: Government of the UK 5https://www.gov.uk/government/
consultations/bail-in-powers-implementation-including-draft-secondary-legislation/bail-in-powers-implementation4.
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generally, there is a plan to move to a pan-European system of
deposit guarantees envisaged for 2024 in order to better protect
against EU-wide shocks. There is discussion that the European
Deposit Insurance Scheme would be administered by the EU
Single Resolution Board, but that option is still being debated.
It is possible that some funds from a EU member state’s deposit
guarantee scheme might be used, though it is unlikely, as it is to
be the last source of funding to be drawn upon in the event of a
bail-in. The deposit insurance scheme would only make a
contribution if all other potential sources of bail-in funding are
insufficient to bail in the bank.345
In Germany, the deposit insurance schemes and recovery
bodies are different entities. There are two main deposit insurance
funds. The statutory scheme is the Entschädigungseinrichtung
deutscher Banken GmbH (Compensation Scheme of German
Private Banks), operated by the Association of German Banks.346
The second fund, the Einlagensicherungsfonds (Deposit
Protection Fund of German Private Banks), is an additional
voluntary scheme operated by the Federal Association of German
Banks.347 It is the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht
(Federal Financial Supervisory Authority), also known as BaFin,
that is the authority for bank recovery in Germany.348 They
345 First, shareholders are bailed in and then there is a “liability
cascade” where holders of debt instruments are exposed to losses
according to the hierarchy of creditors. The contribution from the
deposit insurance scheme is the very last of these creditors. The size
of the contribution that could be made by the deposit insurance
scheme is the amount that the covered deposits would have been
written down had they not been excluded from the bail in.
346 Compensation Scheme of German Private Banks, online: EdB
5http://www.edb-banken.de/en/about-us/4 [“EdB”].
347 Bankenverband, Deposit protection scheme, supra note 71; Dr Hendrik
Haag and Jan Letto Steffen, “Banking regulation in Germany:
overview” (1 April 2017), online: Thomson Reuters 5https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/w-007-4084?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp=14.
348 Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, “Recovery and resolution”, online: BaFin 5https://www.bafin.de/EN/Aufsicht/BankenFinanzdienstleister/Massnahmen/SanierungAbwicklung/sanierung_abwicklung_node_en.html4.
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supervise the funds but do not manage them themselves.349 In
Germany, similar to the rest of Europe, it is possible that some of
the bail-in would come from the German deposit fund; however, it
is also quite unlikely as covered deposits are the very last source of
bail-in funds.
In Australia, since deposit insurance is not funded ex ante, no
funds can come from it to assist in bank recovery. The deposit
insurance scheme, the Financial Claims Scheme, is run by the
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority when the scheme
is activated by the Australian Government.350 The Australian
Prudential Regulatory Authority has the power to investigate,
take control, or appoint an administrator to take control of an
authorized deposit-taking institution if it is insolvent.351 In the
US, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is empowered
by Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act to resolve financial
conglomerates and uses a single-point of entry approach to
do so. The primary purposes of the Deposit Insurance Fund are
to insure the deposits and protect the depositors of insured
banks and to resolve failed banks.352
The FSB has observed that insurance funds should
implement ex ante funding mechanisms to have available the
financial capacity to carry out their mandates effectively; they
should determine the appropriate target level of the deposit
insurance fund on the basis of clear and well-developed criteria
that are consistent with their mandate.353 Deposit insurers
349 EdB, supra note 346; “Deposit protection in Germany: Article from
the Monthly Report” (December 2015), online: Deutsche Bundesbank
Eurosystem 5https://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Downloads/Publications/Monthly_Report_Articles/2015/2015_12_deposit_protection.pdf?blob=publicationFile4.
350 APRS, Financial Claims Scheme, supra note 68.
351 Banking Act 1959, S 13A Consequences of inability or failure of ADI
to meet obligations, online: Commonwealth Consolidated Acts
(Australia) 5http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/
ba195972/s13a.html4.
352 FDIC, “The Deposit Insurance Fund” (22 August 2017), online:
FDIC 5https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/4.
353 FSB, “Enhanced guidance for effective deposit insurance systems —
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should set a reasonable time frame to achieve the expected
target level of deposit insurance fund; and the level of ex ante
funds should not be static. The FSB recognizes that liquidity
funding is a critical component of a deposit insurer’s funding
framework, and such arrangements should be explicitly set out
in law or regulation; the objectives and strategy for fund
management should be clearly set out and aligned with the
deposit insurer’s mandate.354 The FSB observes that deposit
insurance funds can be utilized for many purposes, depending
on legislated mandates, including the reimbursement of
depositors’ claims in the event of bank failures and the
recapitalization of banks.355
In Canada, CDIC’s ex ante fund was established to make
deposit insurance payments or for resolution purposes, similar
to deposit insurers in several jurisdictions. There are both
upside benefits and downside risks to having CDIC as both
resolution authority and responsible for the deposit insurance
fund. Open bank resolution helps protect depositors. CDIC, in
the exercise of its monitoring and early intervention powers to
protect the deposit insurance system, has acquired expertise in
identifying potential bank failure and what may be necessary to
undertake financial restructuring. However, if one of the D-SIB
were to fail, there could be considerable pressure to use funds
from the deposit insurance fund to help resolve the bank’s
financial distress. The objective of the insurance fund is to
protect depositors’ savings, not to resolve the bank, and there is
potential for conflicts of interest. The ability to borrow up to
$22 billion from the federal government, as noted previously,
does assist, but it places Canada’s regime partially back on the
continuum of bail-out more than bail-in. What remains to be
seen is whether the bridge bank and bail-in provisions work
such that the costs of bank failure are paid by equity holders and
Ex-ante funding” (1 June 2015), online: FSB 5http://www.fsb.org/
2015/06/enhanced-guidance-for-effective-deposit-insurance-systems-ex-ante-funding/4.
354 Ibid.
355 Ibid.
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creditors, rather than accessing either deposit insurance funds
or public tax dollars.
V. FOUNDATION — CAPITAL ADEQUACY AND LIQUIDITY
The final aspect of bank resolution is the foundation on
which the financial system rests. The foundation of a bridge is
the component that transfers loads from the substructure to the
bearing strata, and depending on the geotechnical properties of
the bearing strata, shallow or deep foundations are adopted.
For bank resolution, the foundation needs to be deep,
particularly for D-SIB. Thus, capital adequacy and liquidity
are essential parts of the foundation of the Canadian financial
system. If a financial institution cannot meet the standards of
capital adequacy and liquidity, it must be wound-up as quickly
and effectively as possible without weakening Canada’s
financial system.
OSFI fully implemented the Basel III capital rules in 2013, at
which time banks began reporting new CET1 capital adequacy
ratios.356 OSFI reports that smaller Canadian banks’ CET1
capital ratios are above the target level of 7%, while the six DSIB remain above the higher 8% capital requirement.357
The Basel Committee has strengthened its liquidity
framework by developing two minimum standards for
funding and liquidity. First, the liquidity coverage ratio
(“LCR”) promotes the short-term resilience of an institution’s
liquidity risk profile by ensuring that it has sufficient highquality liquid assets to survive a significant stress scenario
lasting for 30 days.358 Second, the net stable funding ratio
(“NSFR”) reduces funding risk over a longer time horizon by
requiring institutions to fund their activities with sufficiently
stable sources in order to mitigate the risk of future funding
stress.359 In Canada, OSFI’s liquidity adequacy framework,
356
357
358
359

OSFI Annual Report 2016-2017, supra note 4.
Reflecting the 1% capital surcharge, ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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which includes the Basel III LCR requirement, came into effect
in January 2015.360 Canadian banks continue to report ratios
above the minimum requirements established for these
metrics.361
The 2016 Bank Act amendments defined D-SIB as part of
the provisions on capital adequacy and liquidation. 362 The
Bank Act grants authority to make both guidelines and
regulations respecting the maintenance by banks of adequate
capital and adequate and appropriate forms of liquidity. 363
Even where a bank is complying with regulations or
guidelines, the Superintendent can direct the bank to
increase its capital or provide additional liquidity. 364
Written notice must be given where the Superintendent’s
appraisal and valuation of an asset of a bank or any of its
subsidiaries varies materially from the value placed on the
asset by the bank or subsidiary.365 The GIC may make
regulations respecting the conditions that D-SIB must meet in
issuing, originating or amending prescribed shares or
liabilities.366
The Canadian system of risk management and strong
capital and liquidity shock absorbers is aimed at addressing
emerging risks and shocks to the financial system. 367
360 At the same time, the Basel III leverage framework and associated
minimum 3% Leverage Ratio (“LR”) requirement replaced the
Assets to Capital Multiple (“ACM”) leverage constraint. Ibid.
361 Ibid at 11.
362 Section 2, Bank Act, supra note 2, “domestic systemically important
bank” means a bank that is designated as a domestic systemically
important bank under s 484.1. See also Part X, Adequacy of Capital
and Liquidity, Bank Act, especially s 484.1(1): As noted above, the
Superintendent of Financial Institutions (“Superintendent”) may, by
order and notice, designate a bank as a D-SIB unless the Minister
advises that it is not in the public interest to do so; s 484.1(1), Bank
Act, ibid.
363 Sections 485(1), 485(2), Bank Act, ibid.
364 Section 485(3), Bank Act, ibid.
365 Section 485(5), Bank Act, ibid.
366 Section 485.01, Bank Act, ibid.
367 Hubb, supra note 83.
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Proportionality and a risk-based approach are the lenses
through which OSFI sets Canadian capital standards. 368 It
works on a “trust but verify” approach.
However, there are a number of highly contested issues that
remain in international standard setting with respect to banks,
including issues regarding the net stable funding ratio
standard,369 liquidity adequacy requirements,370 total loss
absorbing capacity,371 and standards to calibrate risk weights
in proportion to risk.372 OSFI Superintendent Rudin has
observed that Basel III delivered substantial improvements in
the design and calibration of minimum capital requirements,
but the agreement left some significant unfinished business, the
negotiations for which have now stalled.373 Rudin observes
that an effective capital regime should provide healthy
incentives for banks in both good times and bad, and support
confidence in the banking system.374 In good times, banks
should be discouraged from taking excessive risk by requiring
higher capital for riskier assets; and in downturns, an effective
regime encourages banks to maintain adequate capital without
resorting to fire sales of assets or drastic reductions in
lending.375 These issues are highly relevant to the foundation
368
369
370
371

372
373
374
375

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Department of Finance Canada, “Government of Canada PrePublishes Regulations to Promote a Sound and Resilient Financial
System” (16 June 2017), online: Government of Canada 5https://
www.fin.gc.ca/n17/17-057-eng.asp4. The TLAC requirement is to
be set by the Superintendent: see Department of Finance, Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, supra note 19.
Jeremy Rudin, “Waiting for Basel? Next steps for Canada’s bank
capital regime — Remarks” (6 April 2017), online: OSFI 5http://
www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/osfi-bsif/med/sp-ds/Pages/jr20170406.aspx4.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid. The Superintendent reports that Canada has not made
sufficient progress on improving the incentives that the capital
regime provides to banks, and that banks should be required to hold
more loss absorbing capacity if the assets that they own are riskier.
In turn, incentives should discourage banks from loading up on
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of the Canadian banking system, but are beyond the scope of
this article.
VI. CONCLUSION
The discussion in this article illustrates that, while Canada is
considered a leader in bank safety, security and resolution,
there are both overlaps and gaps in the system that could be
remedied. The system relies on the continuing cooperation of
multiple entities, and there are still outstanding questions
regarding resolution of financial institutions that cross-sectors
within Canada and that cross borders in their ownership, assets
and activities. As Canada continues to reform its oversight and
resolution of the financial system, it would do well to consider
how its framework could address the gaps and reduce the
overlap. Parliament could clarify the role of regulators and
financial institutions in ensuring the system is fundamentally
strong and can withstand high winds and global financial
storms. In the interim, Canada’s bank resolution regime does
offer a “bridge over troubled waters”, as it should work to
ensure going-concern resolution of banks whenever possible.

risk, and ensure that they have enough capacity to absorb the losses
that they could plausibly experience.

